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  INTRODUCTION   
The claims of a patent define the “metes and bounds” of an 
invention over which the patent owner has a legal right to bar 
its practice by others. Whether a patent claim is valid and in-
fringed turns on “claim construction”—the interpretation1 of 
claim language in order to ascertain the boundaries of a patent 
claim. Despite the existence of a single, semispecialized appel-
late court—the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
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anie Plamondon Bair, John Duffy, Rebecca Eisenberg, Paul Gugliuzza, Paul 
Heald, Laura Heymann, Dmitry Karshtedt, Jay Kesan, Mark Lemley, Jake Lin-
ford, Michael Madison, Joe Miller, Sean Pager, Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Nichol-
son Price, Jason Rantanen, Greg Reilly, Guy Rub, Joshua Sarnoff, Ryan Vacca, 
Eyal Zamir, as well as participants at the 2017 Stanford/Harvard/Yale Junior 
Faculty Forum at Stanford Law School, the 9th Annual Junior Scholars in In-
tellectual Property Workshop at Michigan State University College of Law, the 
6th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars’ Roundtable at the University of New 
Hampshire School of Law, the 2017 Works-in-Progress in Intellectual Property 
Colloquium at Boston University School of Law, the 2016 Intellectual Property 
Scholars Conference at Stanford Law School, and faculty workshops at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas at Little Rock, the University of Illinois College of Law, and 
Memphis Law. Copyright © 2018 by Jeremy W. Bock. 
 1. Some scholars have noted a distinction between “interpretation” and 
“construction.” See Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 534–35 (2013) (dif-
ferentiating between “determining the linguistic meaning of a text (‘interpreta-
tion’), and giving legal effect to that text (‘construction’)”). For the purposes of 
this Article, “interpretation” and “construction” will be used interchangeably 
because they are largely treated as synonyms by various actors in the patent 
system to refer to the process of ascertaining claim scope. For example, exam-
iners apply the “broadest reasonable interpretation,” while district courts are 
often referred to as engaging in claim construction. In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 
F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
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Circuit—that handles all patent appeals, claim construction re-
mains notoriously unpredictable.2 The inability of the public to 
reliably ascertain the boundaries of a patent claim creates a fail-
ure of notice that increases the risk of inadvertent infringement 
and litigation,3 which may dissuade investments in new technol-
ogies.4 By way of analyzing the causes of uncertainty in claim 
construction, scholars have undertaken doctrinal, historical, lin-
guistic, and empirical studies.5 However, much less attention 
has focused on analyzing claim construction through the lens of 
behavioral science—in particular, cognitive and social psychol-
ogy—in evaluating the extent to which the reader-to-reader6 
variance in interpretations of the same claim may be a function 
of the boundedly rational7 nature of its readers, who are heavily 
influenced by their environment.8 
This Article undertakes the first detailed exploration of the 
behavioral elements—such as cognitive biases, priors, and situ-
ational factors—that may influence how a reader interprets a 
claim. Because behavioral elements tend to affect readers at an 
unconscious level, they can pervade the process of construing 
claims, affecting the choice of canons, the selection of interpre-
tive sources, the crafting of arguments, and the construction 
adopted (by a court). Analyzing the behavioral aspects of claim 
construction may help increase our understanding as to why a 
single claim may have N different meanings according to N dif-
ferent readers, who may be: inventors, patent attorneys, patent 
examiners, plaintiff ’s litigation counsel, defendant’s litigation 
counsel, district judges, administrative patent judges, Federal 
 
 2. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? 
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009) 
[hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts] (“Claim construction is sufficiently 
uncertain that many parties don’t settle a case until after the court has con-
strued the claims, because there is no baseline for agreement on what the patent 
might possibly cover.”). But see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: 
Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1025, 1092 (2007) (concluding that “claim construction on the whole has 
been no less determinate than other aspects of patent law”). 
 3. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 9 (2008). 
 4. See id. at 10–11. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. Throughout this Article, the term “reader” refers to anyone who reads 
a patent claim. 
 7. Bounded rationality “refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive 
abilities are not infinite.” Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (citation omitted). 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
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Circuit judges, engineers, scientists, business people, investors, 
and others who may need to know the scope of a patent claim. 
For readers who are in an adversarial relationship, behav-
ioral influences can aggravate the difference in competing views 
of claim scope by prompting opposing parties to take more ex-
treme positions.9 For readers with shared goals, the differences 
in their background knowledge or training might lead them to 
reach different estimates of claim scope.10 Behavioral influences 
may also contribute to reader variance within institutions, such 
as the federal courts (e.g., district judges vs. Federal Circuit 
judges) and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) (e.g., pa-
tent examiners vs. administrative patent judges), in light of sit-
uational differences.11 It may also aggravate the variance in 
scope determinations between institutions, such as when a claim 
allowed by a patent examiner based on a narrow reading is sub-
sequently litigated in federal court on a much broader reading, 
thereby depriving the public of the benefit of patent examina-
tion.12  
The impact of cognitive biases and priors, along with the sit-
uational factors that may amplify their influence, cannot (as a 
practical matter) be eliminated from claim construction. How-
ever, it is worth exploring whether their effects could be miti-
gated, as the current claim interpretation regime appears to 
have been designed without regard to behavioral considerations. 
The interpretive canons presently used in federal court litiga-
tion, based on Phillips v. AWH Corp.,13 as well as the “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” (BRI) used by the PTO,14 are highly 
susceptible to behavioral influences because they require the 
close parsing15 of claim terms. Because parsing involves the ex-
ercise of discretion in selecting, weighing, and applying multiple 
interpretive sources and rules, it provides various opportunities 
for behavioral elements to affect the analysis. 
To mitigate the influence of behavioral elements in claim 
construction, this Article recommends replacing the current 
claim construction regime—which entails extensive parsing of 
 
 9. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 10. See infra Part II.D. 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.1. 
 13. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 14. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 15. As used in this Article, the word “parse” and its variants refer to the 
close, systematic analysis of text using the relevant canons of construction as-
sociated with that type of text. 
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claim language to divine the “plain and ordinary” meaning or the 
“broadest reasonable” one16—with an alternative rule for use 
across different institutions that involves minimal parsing and 
closely ties the scope of the claims to the content of the patent 
document. Such an interpretive rule may be less susceptible to 
behavioral influences as it would cabin the exercise of judgment. 
Moreover, the first-order approximation of claim scope under 
such a rule would closely hew to the disclosed embodiments, 
which the cognitive science literature suggests would likely cor-
respond to the estimate of claim scope reached by the vast ma-
jority of the potential readers of a given patent17—who would be 
nonparsers18 (e.g., individuals who are not trained in legal anal-
ysis, such as engineers, scientists, business people, and inves-
tors), rather than parsers (e.g., attorneys and judges). 
As it happens, there exists a rule of claim interpretation that 
resembles the proposed alternative rule: means-plus-function 
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), whereby claim scope is limited 
to the structures disclosed in the patent document and their 
equivalents.19 However, under current Federal Circuit case law, 
§ 112(f) may be applied only to claim limitations that recite a 
“function without reciting sufficient structure for performing 
that function,”20 such as “means for communicating” or “commu-
nication mechanism” (as opposed to a term such as “computer 
network”). Accordingly, this Article proposes that means-plus-
function analysis apply to all claim terms. Under this proposal, 
the default rule of construction may be more resistant (than ei-
ther the Phillips methodology or BRI) to allowing behavioral el-
ements to aggravate reader variance in claim interpretation. 
This is because a means-plus-function rule largely tracks what 
the bulk of the readers—who are nonparsers—are likely to do 
naturally and also cabins the extent to which the parsing readers 
may introduce interpretive variance beyond the disclosed em-
bodiments. As a result, the first-order approximations of the 
boundaries of a patent claim reached by a lay technologist and 
someone with expertise in patent law may be closer under the 
 
 16. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–16 (discussing these canons of interpre-
tation). 
 17. See infra Parts II, III.B. 
 18. As used in this Article, a “nonparser” is someone who does not apply 
the applicable canons of construction in ascertaining the meaning of text having 
legal significance. 
 19. See infra notes 227–33 and accompanying text. 
 20. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
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proposed all-means-plus-function rule than under the current 
Phillips/BRI regime. 
In evaluating the takeaways from this Article, it is worth 
noting that the influence of behavioral elements on the interpre-
tation of text is not a problem unique to patent claims. Various 
parts of this Article may describe behavioral artifacts that re-
semble those encountered in statutory construction21 and con-
tract interpretation.22 To the extent there may be any limita-
tions on the applicability of any takeaways beyond patent law, 
they may arise from certain features idiosyncratic to the crea-
tion, structure, function, and enforcement of a patent. For exam-
ple, the proposed solution23 to mitigate behavioral effects in pa-
tent claim construction requires reliance on the patent’s 
specification,24 which is present in every patent document and 
must comply with certain statutory requirements governing its 
content.25 The specification does not have an equivalent in either 
statutory construction or contract interpretation. Unlike a stat-
ute and its legislative history, the claims are actually part of the 
specification and the entire patent document is considered an in-
tegrated instrument.26 And unlike a contract, the final form of 
 
 21. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 158, 178–
79 (2006) (observing that judges engage in statutory or constitutional interpre-
tation “under conditions of empirical uncertainty and bounded rationality,” and 
recommending that they “adopt interpretive precepts that are good enough . . . 
rather than attempting to produce the very best interpretive regime”); Jill C. 
Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1579 (2014) (“[F]indings from diverse branches of 
psychology suggest that legal misreading arises out of . . . various kinds of 
thinking errors.”); Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the Text—On Sequencing 
Effects in Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 439 (2016) 
(analyzing order effects in the use of interpretive sources). 
 22. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris, Rules for Interpreting Incomplete Contracts: 
A Cautionary Note, 62 LA. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (2002) (“Are the limitations on the 
use of usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance not strong 
enough to overcome possible preconceptions and cognitive biases?”); Lawrence 
Solan et al., Essay, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1298 (2008) (“Our studies strongly suggest that both 
laypeople and judges are subject to false consensus bias in deciding whether 
nonprototypical situations fit within contractual language.”); Omri Ben-Shahar 
& Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments 
41 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coarse-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 791, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905873 (proposing use of surveys for 
contract interpretation to avoid cognitive and information biases of judges). 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (setting forth the disclosure requirement). 
 26. See id. § 112(b) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 
 1278 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1273 
 
the specification and its associated claims are determined in an 
ex parte administrative proceeding (i.e., review by a patent ex-
aminer) that yields an instrument enforceable against the pub-
lic.27 Despite these differences, the analysis of the behavioral el-
ements provided in this Article may be helpful in diagnosing and 
modeling problematic behavioral artifacts in other contexts. 
This Article proceeds in multiple Parts. Part I situates the 
problem of behavioral influences within the rich literature on 
claim construction, and also summarizes the existing claim in-
terpretation regime. Part II descriptively explores how certain 
behavioral elements, such as cognitive biases, priors, and situa-
tional considerations, may contribute to reader-dependence in 
assessments of claim scope. The specific behavioral elements dis-
cussed in this Article do not constitute an exhaustive set of all 
possible behavioral elements that might influence claim con-
struction. Part III presents one possible solution to mitigate the 
influence of behavioral elements in claim construction: expand-
ing the application of means-plus-function analysis to all claim 
terms. This Part also addresses potential implications and con-
cerns and is followed by a brief Conclusion. 
I.  BACKGROUND   
A. OVERVIEW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ISSUES 
A patent has several parts. The specification sets forth a de-
tailed description of the invention in a manner sufficient to allow 
an ordinary artisan in the relevant technical field to make and 
use it.28 A set of drawings is usually included to aid in the un-
derstanding of the subject matter disclosed.29 At the end of the 
patent document are the claims, which define the scope—that is, 
the boundaries—of the invention.30 
During the lifecycle of a patent, its claims are crafted and 
later interpreted by a multitude of readers at different stages. 
To begin, an inventor talks to a patent attorney,31 who prepares 
 
which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” (emphasis 
added)); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (“The patent is a fully integrated written instrument.”), aff ’d, 517 U.S. 
370 (1996). 
 27. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 986. 
 28. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 29. Id. § 113. 
 30. Id. § 112(b)–(f ). 
 31. Inventors may also be represented by patent agents, who are nonlaw-
yers registered to practice before the PTO. To simplify the discussion, the term 
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a patent application that is filed at the PTO and is examined by 
a patent examiner.32 After the patent issues, it may be asserted 
by the patentee against an accused infringer.33 In a patent suit, 
each party is represented by litigation counsel in federal court 
where the adjudicator is a district judge.34 During litigation, the 
accused infringer might also challenge the validity of the patent 
through an administrative proceeding at the PTO (e.g., inter 
partes review) that is conducted by administrative patent judges 
at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).35 On appeal from 
either the district court or the PTAB, Federal Circuit judges will 
review the scope of the claims in connection with adjudicating 
liability issues.36 Outside of the litigation context, the patent 
may be reviewed by business people, engineers, investors, and 
others who might be making business decisions based on their 
impressions of what the scope of the claims might be. 
The determination of claim scope is the key inquiry in every 
patent case (as well as in many transactions), as it underlies the 
assessment of whether a claim is valid and infringed. Claim con-
struction is an exercise in exegesis involving the application of 
multiple—at times, conflicting37—canons under Federal Circuit 
decisional law, as most recently restated in Phillips v. AWH 
Corp.38 Claim construction has been the focus of considerable 
scholarly attention by virtue of its centrality in patent litigation 
and the difficulty of reliably ascertaining the boundaries of the 
invention.39 Commentators have pointed to the Federal Circuit’s 
reversal rate for district court claim constructions as a reflection 
 
“patent attorney” as used in this Article also includes patent agents. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 131. 
 33. Id. § 281. 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original ju-
risdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to pa-
tents . . . .”). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 311. 
 36. Id. § 141. 
 37. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “In-
terpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 
21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 362 (2008) (“[H]istorically, case law and commen-
tary on claim construction have been replete with such a mélange of conflicting 
canons that one can find some historical support for almost any interpretive 
methodology.”). 
 38. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 39. A collection of representative sources is provided in J. Jonas Anderson 
& Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative 
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 n.6 (2014). 
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of the uncertainty in determining claim scope.40 According to one 
estimate, the reversal rate has ranged between a high of forty-
four percent to a low of 16.5% on an annual basis.41  
The literature contains a variety of explanatory theories for 
this uncertainty and proposals for its mitigation. Some have sug-
gested that claim construction is inherently indeterminate.42 
Others, including some Federal Circuit judges,43 blame the de 
novo standard of review for claim constructions on appeal.44 
Some point to the schism within the Federal Circuit regarding 
 
 40. A number of empirical studies have analyzed the rate at which the Fed-
eral Circuit has reversed the district court’s claim construction. See, e.g., id., at 
1–2; Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Con-
struction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1075 (2001); Shawn P. Miller, 
“Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries and High Claim Construction Reversal 
Rates, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 809, 809 (2014); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District 
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 
(2001); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 223 (2008) 
[hereinafter Schwartz, Practice]; David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal 
Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2010). 
 41. Anderson & Menell, supra note 39, at 1. 
 42. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 2, at 1745 (“[C]laim 
construction may be inherently indeterminate: it may simply be impossible to 
cleanly map words to things.”); Schwartz, Practice, supra note 40, at 259 (“Claim 
construction may be inherently indeterminate.”). 
 43. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 39, at 32–33 (describing disagree-
ment among Federal Circuit judges regarding de novo review). 
 44. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (“[C]laim construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo 
review on appeal.”). In recent years, Cybor was largely reaffirmed by the Su-
preme Court, which held that claim construction, as a question of law, is re-
viewed de novo, while any subsidiary factfinding by the district court is re-
viewed for clear error. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 
836–39 (2015). Similarly, the PTAB’s analysis of claim scope is reviewed de 
novo. Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O., 806 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (“[W]e conduct a de novo review of the Board’s determination of the 
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language.”). 
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the role of the specification in claim construction,45 and the re-
sulting panel dependence on appellate outcomes.46 Others have 
proposed alternative claim construction methodologies, such as 
applying linguistic techniques,47 or moving away from periph-
eral claiming48 and returning to central claiming.49 Some have 
suggested that patentees should be required to disclose in the 
specification additional information to aid in claim construction, 
such as a glossary of terms and a list of interpretive sources.50 
 
 45. See, e.g., Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the En Banc Federal 
Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim Construction Issue, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 
43, 45–46 (2013); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105, 1111 n.19, 1138 tbl.1 (2004) [hereinafter Wagner & Petherbridge, 
Federal Circuit Succeeding]. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge assigned the 
judges on the Federal Circuit to one of three factions based on their preferred 
claim construction methodology: (1) the “proceduralists,” who emphasize the or-
dinary meaning of the claim terms and follow a strict, rules-based hierarchy of 
interpretive sources; (2) the “holistics,” who emphasize the specification and the 
prosecution history as interpretive sources and apply a more flexible, case-spe-
cific analysis; and (3) the “swing judges,” who comprise a middle group. Id. Wag-
ner and Petherbridge found that the proceduralist methodology was applied in 
a clear majority (63.1%) of the cases. Id. at 1170. 
 46. Wagner & Petherbridge, Federal Circuit Succeeding, supra note 45, at 
1163 (“We find . . . that the individual membership and overall composition of a 
three-judge panel that decides an appeal has a statistically significant effect on 
the methodological approach used to analyze claim construction issues.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 
38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 62–63 (2006). 
 48. This is modern peripheral claiming, which is distinct from the tradi-
tional (i.e., pre–Federal Circuit) principles of peripheral claiming, which, as 
chronicled by John Duffy, bear a greater resemblance to central claiming and 
means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f ). John F. Duffy, Counter-
productive Notice in Literalistic Versus Peripheral Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1197, 1206, 1211 (2016). Throughout this Article, the term “peripheral claim-
ing,” without any adjectives, will generally refer to the modern, literalistic pe-
ripheral claiming principles established by the Federal Circuit. To avoid ambi-
guity, references to traditional peripheral claiming will be made explicitly with 
the appropriate modifier. 
 49. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 2, at 1747; Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 735–39 (2009). 
“Peripheral claiming,” which is the current system of claiming, defines the 
outermost boundary of the patentee’s invention, while “central claiming” sets 
forth the core concept (or the gist) of the patentee’s invention. Burk & Lemley, 
Fence Posts, supra note 2, at 1747. According to John Duffy, the current version 
of peripheral claiming, which is based on Federal Circuit precedent, is distinct 
from the traditional form of peripheral claiming as practiced in the pre–Federal 
Circuit era, which bears a greater resemblance to means-plus-function analysis. 
Duffy, supra note 48, at 1206. 
 50. See Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful 
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 183–84 (2005). 
 1282 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1273 
 
Still others believe that generalist51 district judges may be 
poorly equipped to handle claim construction,52 and point to spe-
cialized courts53 or expedited claim construction appeals54 as po-
tential solutions.  
It is unclear which of the many theories surrounding the un-
certainty in claim construction and the proposals for improving 
it are actually targeting its underlying problems, rather than the 
symptoms. Like the proverbial blind men touching different 
parts of an elephant, each of the various theories and proposals 
in the literature focuses on different aspects of the claim con-
struction conundrum, which may have several underlying pa-
thologies that are intertwined. To this body of literature, this Ar-
ticle contributes an exploration of another facet of the problem: 
the behavioral aspect. The complaint about indeterminacy being 
“inherent”55 in claim interpretation suggests there might be an 
unconscious aspect to it,56 such that an analytical inquiry 
through the lens of cognitive science and social psychology might 
be fruitful. The literature on the cognitive science and social psy-
chology aspects of claim construction is relatively sparse and is 
largely limited to discrete sections in a handful of articles.57 This 
Article synthesizes this scattered literature and expands on it to 
 
 51. See S. Jay Plager, Abolish the Court of Federal Claims? A Question of 
Democratic Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 796–97 (2003) (observing that 
district judges are not patent specialists and most do not have scientific train-
ing). 
 52. See Moore, supra note 40, at 38. 
 53. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and 
the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 444 
(2011). But see David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study 
of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District 
Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 
1704 (2009) (reporting results of empirical study where “[t]he data do not reveal 
any evidence that the patent-experienced ALJs of the ITC are more accurate at 
claim construction than generalist district court judges”). 
 54. See Moore, supra note 40, at 39. 
 55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 56. Cf. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictabil-
ity of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1058 (2007) [hereinafter 
Lefstin, Interpretive Regimes] (“The process of attaching meaning to a word, or 
associating a physical structure with a word, may be cognitively deeper and 
more primitive than the more abstract determinations demanded by patent 
law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 57. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 49, at 763–67; Lefstin, Interpretive Re-
gimes, supra note 56, at 1050–60; Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: 
Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Ir-
rational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1440–41 (2006). 
 2018] BEHAVIORAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 1283 
 
provide a more detailed exploration of the behavioral factors that 
may influence how a reader interprets a claim, along with a spe-
cific proposal for mitigating them. 
B. THE CURRENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REGIME 
Currently, there are two systems of patent claim interpreta-
tion in use: (1) the claim construction methodology applied by 
federal district courts in accordance with Phillips v. AWH 
Corp.;58 and (2) the “broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI) 
standard used in PTO proceedings.59 In both systems, the claims 
are to be construed from the perspective of a “person having or-
dinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA),60 who is a technically skilled 
individual possessing an encyclopedic knowledge of all relevant 
prior art.61 When reading patent claims, the PHOSITA is as-
sumed to be a careful, disinterested reader who, despite being 
untrained in the law, is unnaturally adept at exegesis. 
1. The Phillips Methodology 
The Phillips methodology applied by the district courts is a 
set of interpretive canons, some of which are patent specific 
while others are analogous to those for statutory construction 
and contract interpretation.62 The primary canons include the 
following: (1) unless the patentee acted as his own lexicogra-
pher,63 the words of a claim are generally given their ordinary 
meaning as understood by a skilled artisan at the time of inven-
tion;64 (2) the claims should be read in light of the specification;65 
 
 58. 415 F.3d 1303 (2005) (en banc). 
 59. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 25, Nov. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP], https:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2017). 
 60. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (requiring PHOSITA perspective for Phil-
lips methodology); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (requiring PHOSITA perspective for BRI). The phrase “person having 
ordinary skill in the art” is found in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The corresponding 
acronym, PHOSITA, is a common shorthand expression used in patent law (and 
throughout this Article) to denote the concept of the ordinarily skilled artisan. 
 61. See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
 62. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in 
Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 339 n.33 (2007) (“[C]ourts have found 
it useful to rely on principles of contract and statutory interpretation for various 
aspects of claim construction. Which discipline presents the most useful analogy 
depends on the precise issue at hand.”). 
 63. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. 
 64. Id. at 1312–13. 
 65. Id. at 1315–16. 
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and (3) the limitations and features of the illustrative embodi-
ments shown in the specification should not be imported into the 
claims.66 Because these canons are often in tension, emphasizing 
certain ones over others can affect the extent to which the scope 
of a claim may extend beyond the embodiments disclosed in the 
specification. According to Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, 
there exist two distinct camps of Federal Circuit judges who 
have different views on the relative importance of these canons: 
(1) the “proceduralists,” who emphasize the “plain and ordinary” 
meaning of the claim terms and follow a strict, rule-based hier-
archy of interpretive sources; and (2) the “holistics,” who focus 
on the specification and the prosecution history and apply a more 
flexible, case-specific analysis.67 
Some commentators view the proceduralist approach as the 
superior methodology that better supports the public notice func-
tion of a patent claim.68 However, the emphasis on finding the 
“plain and ordinary” meaning may entail a heavier reliance on 
extrinsic evidence (such as dictionaries), which may provide 
more opportunities for the introduction of bias than the use of 
intrinsic evidence, given the “virtually unbounded universe of 
potential extrinsic evidence of some marginal relevance that 
could be brought to bear on any claim construction question.”69 
Indeed, in some cases, the choice of dictionary might be outcome 
determinative.70 
But the holistic approach may also be problematic. There is 
a fine line between reading a limitation into a claim and reading 
that claim in light of the specification. These complementary 
canons relating to the use of the specification in claim construc-
tion have created mischief because it is difficult to apply one 
canon reliably without running afoul of the other.71 Depending 
 
 66. Id. at 1323. 
 67. Wagner & Petherbridge, Federal Circuit Succeeding, supra note 45. 
 68. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 123, 143–45 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). 
 69. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. 
 70. Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and 
Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 
876 (2005) (“[D]ifferences among different dictionaries can . . . generate differ-
ent claim construction analyses.”). 
 71. Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 2, at 1771–72 (“In practice, this 
set of rules is nearly impossible to follow, since no one can really tell when they 
have crossed the line from interpreting the claim in light of the specification to 
reading forbidden elements from the specification into the claim.”). 
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on his agenda or priors, the reader of a claim can emphasize one 
canon over the other to achieve a particular result. As such, the 
specification, despite being “the single best guide to the meaning 
of a disputed term,”72 may be selectively relied upon to varying 
degrees to suit the reader’s purposes. 
Whether one is a proceduralist, a holistic, or somewhere in 
between, the Phillips methodology requires one to engage in the 
act of parsing claim language, which is a cognitively intensive 
process that entails analyzing claim terms and exercising judg-
ment on the selection of competing interpretive canons and 
sources. As discussed below, this process may leave a reader sus-
ceptible to allowing various behavioral elements to affect his in-
terpretation of a claim.73 
2. Broadest Reasonable Interpretation 
The PTO’s method of interpreting claims is the “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” (BRI),74 which is used by patent ex-
aminers during examination75 and by PTAB judges during ad-
ministrative proceedings for reviewing the validity of issued pa-
tents, such as inter partes review.76 BRI is supposed to make it 
easier to invalidate a claim by making it broader in scope than 
it otherwise would be when construed by a district court.77 
 
 72. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (“[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction 
analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of 
a disputed term.”). 
 73. See infra Parts II, III.A. 
 74. The term “broadest reasonable construction” is used as well, and is used 
interchangeably with “broadest reasonable interpretation.” E.g., In re Cuozzo 
Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“This court has 
approved of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in a variety of 
[PTO] proceedings . . . . [W]e have cited the long history of the PTO’s giving 
claims their broadest reasonable construction.” (emphases added) (footnote 
omitted)). 
 75. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 76. 37 C.F.R. §42.100(b) (2017) (specifying use of “broadest reasonable con-
struction” in inter partes review proceedings). Other PTO administrative pro-
ceedings where BRI is used include reexaminations, see In re Yamamoto, 740 
F.2d 1569, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984), reissues, see In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 
1019 (C.C.P.A. 1981), and interferences, see Yorkey v. Diab, 605 F.3d 1297, 
1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 77. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that applying 
the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard “serves the public interest by 
reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope 
than is justified” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also 
Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Pa-
tent Office’s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 
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BRI does not correspond to the broadest possible meaning.78 
As contemplated by the Federal Circuit, BRI is “the broadest rea-
sonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they 
would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking 
into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or 
otherwise that may be afforded by the written description con-
tained in the applicant’s specification.”79 According to the Man-
ual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)—the PTO’s refer-
ence manual for patent examination80—BRI requires that the 
words of a claim be given their “plain meaning,” which is the or-
dinary and customary meaning known to a PHOSITA, unless it 
would be inconsistent with the specification (such as when the 
applicant has acted as his own lexicographer or if there is a dis-
claimer).81 While the ordinary and customary meaning may be 
gleaned from “a variety of sources, including the words of the 
claims themselves, the specification, drawings, and prior art,” it 
is improper to import limitations from the specification into the 
claims when applying BRI.82 
Notably, these characteristics of BRI resemble the Phillips 
methodology applied by the district courts,83 with some commen-
tators observing that BRI is materially indistinguishable84 from 
the Phillips methodology.85 According to one estimate by PTAB 
 
303 (2009) (“The requirement that the USPTO give the claim language its 
‘broadest’ reasonable interpretation necessarily contemplates a larger resulting 
claim scope than a district court would determine under the normal interpreta-
tion methodology without the ‘broadest’ lens.”). 
 78. MPEP, supra note 59, at 2100-37. 
 79. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054. 
 80. A description of the purpose of the MPEP is provided in its Foreword 
page. MPEP, supra note 59. 
 81. Id. § 2111.01. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Bey & Cotropia, supra note 77, at 309 (“[S]ection 2111 . . . recites 
the same methodology used in district courts to interpret claims.”). MPEP 
§ 2111—2111.05 and the PTAB opinions, which tend to lay out the BRI stand-
ard in detail, cite Federal Circuit claim construction cases that are appeals from 
district court litigation. 
 84. Under this view, the primary difference between them would lie not in 
any interpretive canons, but rather in the application of the presumption of va-
lidity: when there is an ambiguity, a district court may construe the claim so as 
to preserve its validity (as a last resort), see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005), whereas an examiner applying BRI does not, be-
cause the presumption of validity is inapplicable to any proceedings at the PTO, 
see In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 855–59 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
 85. Brief of Amicus Curiae Paul R. Michel in Support of Neither Party at 8, 
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446) (“With the 
exception of looking to disclaimers in the prosecution history under Phillips, but 
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Lead Judge Michael Tierney, the choice between BRI and the 
Phillips methodology would not change the result in ninety per-
cent of cases.86 However, other commentators have character-
ized BRI as a distinct interpretive process—wholly separate 
from the Phillips methodology used by the district courts—that 
is “incurably ambiguous” and “severely lacking.”87 The descrip-
tion of BRI in the MPEP has been criticized for vagueness, as it 
apparently lists the general principles of the Phillips methodol-
ogy without elaborating on “the specifics of the BRI standard 
unique to the USPTO.”88 Indeed, some have argued for the elim-
ination of BRI in favor of having the PTO apply the same inter-
pretive methodology as the district courts.89 
Regardless of which view of BRI is correct, both views de-
scribe BRI as a process of interpretation, which, like the Phillips 
methodology, requires the reader to parse claim terms using a 
variety of interpretive sources and rules. As explored in the next 
Section, this need for parsing may introduce opportunities for 
behavioral elements to influence the analysis. 
II.  THE BEHAVIORAL ELEMENTS   
Currently, patent claim interpretation (whether under Phil-
lips or BRI) is a highly analytical endeavor that requires a 
reader to interpret text through the exercise of judgment and 
discretion in the selection of the pertinent interpretive sources, 
the appropriate interpretive canons, and the manner of analysis. 
As discussed below, the exercise of judgment and discretion in 
the course of parsing claim language may provide opportunities 
 
not under BRI, these standards are basically the same . . . .”); Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Unified Patents Inc. in Support of Respondent at 27, Cuozzo Speed 
Techs., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446) (“[T]here is little difference between 
BRI and a Phillips claim construction . . . if properly applied, these tools should 
lead to identical constructions, whether they are made in the PTO from the 
point of view of examination or in district court from the point of view of litiga-
tion.”); Scott A. McKeown, BRI and Phillips Are No Different—Unified Patents 
Responds, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 17, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/ 
17/bri-phillips-no-different/id=68340. 
 86. Joseph Marks, PTAB Chief Judge: Don’t Sweat Cuozzo, 92 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 861, 92 PTCJ 2270 (July 22, 2016). 
 87. See, e.g., Bey & Cotropia, supra note 77, at 288. 
 88. Id. at 309–10. 
 89. See, e.g., Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecu-
tion, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 180 (2007) (arguing for “the abandonment of 
the ‘broadest reasonable construction’ rule for interpreting claims in pending 
patent applications” and proposing that “pending applications . . . be construed 
using the same rule used in litigation”). 
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for cognitive biases, priors, and situational considerations to af-
fect the end result, leaving claims susceptible to being treated as 
a “nose of wax.”90 This can yield highly divergent assessments of 
claim scope when the same interpretive methodology (e.g., the 
Phillips methodology in district court litigation) is applied to the 
same claim by two different readers, each of whom brings his 
own behavioral “baggage” to the analysis. 
This Part endeavors to unpack a reader’s behavioral “bag-
gage” by providing an overview of the various behavioral ele-
ments and a discussion of how they might impact claim interpre-
tation. It is worth noting that each behavioral element may not 
necessarily operate alone. Indeed, a reader may have multiple 
behavioral elements interact synergistically while construing a 
claim. In some cases, one behavioral element may mute or coun-
teract the influence of another behavioral element. 
In organizing the discussion, the behavioral elements are 
classified into three broad categories: (1) heuristics and cognitive 
biases (i.e., unconscious decision-making); (2) priors (i.e., the 
reader’s background knowledge and attitudes); and (3) situa-
tional considerations (i.e., the impact of the reader’s environ-
ment). The specific behavioral elements discussed in this Article 
do not constitute an exhaustive catalog, but instead serve to 
highlight what are likely to be the primary behavioral influences 
as suggested by various empirical and experimental studies re-
lating to the processes and circumstances under which patent 
claims are construed. 
A. HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIASES 
According to a model developed by Daniel Kahneman and 
others,91 decision-making is a cognitive operation handled by 
two systems that coexist in the mind: “System 1,” which is the 
unconscious, intuitive, and impressionistic decision-making pro-
cess that operates quickly (if not automatically); and “System 2,” 
 
 90. The Federal Circuit has used this phrase to express concern with at-
tempts by parties to twist the meaning of the claims to serve a particular pur-
pose. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“A patent may not, like a ‘nose of wax,’ be twisted one way to 
avoid anticipation and another to find infringement.” (quoting Sterner Lighting, 
Inc. v. Allied Elec. Supply, Inc., 431 F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1970))). 
 91. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) 
(synthesizing several decades’ worth of psychological research on judgment and 
decision-making). 
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which is the conscious, deliberative, and effortful decision-mak-
ing process that operates more slowly.92 System 1 relies heavily 
on heuristics, which are mental shortcuts people use uncon-
sciously to process complex information and manage uncer-
tainty.93 In general, a heuristic operates by substituting a diffi-
cult question with an easier one.94 This can lead to an imperfect 
answer, which, depending on the circumstances, may be ade-
quate or erroneous.95 When heuristics yield errors, they can be 
systematic in nature, giving rise to cognitive biases.96 System 2, 
which allows for self-criticism and self-reflection, has the ability 
to resist, question, and correct the conclusions reached by the 
heuristics of System 1.97 However, System 2 will often adopt or 
ratify the answers provided by System 1, especially if the former 
is lazy or weak, or if emotions are involved.98 In essence, a deci-
sion reached through the unconscious operation of a heuristic via 
System 1 may become the subject of conscious deliberation and 
eventual justification via System 2. 
In claim construction, different results may be obtained de-
pending on the extent to which the answer provided by System 
1 is modified by System 2. This dynamic (and terminology) will 
appear throughout this Article. 
1. Anchoring and Availability 
When construing a claim, a reader may consult, seek, or be 
provided with information from a variety of sources in support 
of that task. Cognitive biases may contribute to reader-depend-
ence in claim interpretation when different readers of the same 
claim work with different information sets. As Jeffrey Lefstin 
 
 92. Id. at 20–21. 
 93. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974); see also KAHNEMAN, supra 
note 91, at 98 (“The technical definition of heuristic is a simple procedure that 
helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions.”). 
 94. KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, at 97–99. 
 95. Id. at 98 (“There is a heuristic alternative to careful reasoning, which 
sometimes works fairly well and sometimes leads to serious errors.”). 
 96. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93 (“In general, these heuristics are 
quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.”). 
 97. KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, at 99 (“System 2 has the opportunity to re-
ject [the] intuitive [System 1] answer, or to modify it by incorporating other in-
formation.”). 
 98. Id. (“[A] lazy System 2 often follows the path of least effort and endorses 
a heuristic answer without much scrutiny of whether it is truly appropriate.”); 
see also id. at 103 (“In the context of attitudes . . . System 2 is more of an apolo-
gist for the emotions of System 1 than a critic of those emotions . . . .”). 
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has observed, for a given claim construction issue, the infor-
mation the litigators have reviewed, the district judge has con-
sidered, and the Federal Circuit judges have been presented 
with on appeal may differ in quantity, quality, order, and/or sub-
stance because the information available to each of these three 
types of readers has been successively filtered and rearranged 
for brevity, clarity, relevance, and/or admissibility as the litiga-
tion progresses.99 
Similarly, in proceedings at the PTO, the inventor, the pa-
tent attorney, the examiner, and the PTAB judges all work with 
different information sets relating to the same claim when eval-
uating its scope under BRI. In addition to the successive filtering 
and rearranging of information, different information sets may 
also result from differences in the nature of the proceedings: as 
between an ex parte proceeding (e.g., patent examination) and 
an adversarial one (e.g., a PTAB postgrant proceeding), the lat-
ter type of proceeding allows the reader to be exposed to a wider 
universe of possible claim interpretations. 
Such variations in information sets for the same claim con-
struction issue can lead different readers to reach different con-
structions as a result of System 1 processes such as anchoring 
and the availability heuristic. Anchoring occurs when a person’s 
judgment is heavily influenced by some initial piece of infor-
mation received.100 For example, judges and juries are prone to 
treating an initial damages estimate as a starting point that ma-
terially influences the ultimate amount awarded.101 In patent 
cases, anchoring may contribute to the formulation of a claim 
construction that is heavily influenced by the particular features 
 
 99. Lefstin, Interpretive Regimes, supra note 56, at 1050–53. 
 100. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93, at 1128. 
 101. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring 
in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 353, 367 (1999) (finding that “as the level of the [punitive damages] cap 
increased, the size and variability of the awards increased as well”); Andrew J. 
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of 
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1291 (2005) (reporting that 
“the high-anchor judges gave substantially higher awards and the low-anchor 
judges gave substantially lower awards”). 
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of the accused device,102 which, under Federal Circuit law, can-
not be used to construe claims.103 Although the Federal Circuit 
has instructed trial judges to “not prejudge the ultimate infringe-
ment analysis by construing claims with an aim to include or 
exclude an accused product or process,”104 this admonition may 
not effectively guard against anchoring—which operates uncon-
sciously—once the details of the accused device are presented to 
the court. Indeed, according to the phenomenon known as the 
“curse of knowledge,” information, once learned, can be difficult 
to ignore.105 Studies by Jeffrey Rachlinski, Andrew Wistrich, and 
Chris Guthrie suggest that judges who are exposed to inadmis-
sible or irrelevant information may be unconsciously influenced 
by it in later decisions—even if they had issued an earlier ruling 
to exclude the same information.106 Accordingly, if the initial ac-
cused product had been substituted with another by the time the 
case went up on appeal or if the patentee had filed a parallel suit 
to assert the same claim against a different accused product in a 
second court, then the district judge in the first court, the Fed-
eral Circuit judges, and the district judge in the second court 
could each formulate different constructions for the same claim 
that are anchored to different accused products first seen in their 
respective tribunals. 
The availability heuristic refers to the tendency of people to 
make judgments regarding the likelihood of an event or the mer-
its of an idea based on information that comes to mind easily, as 
opposed to items that are more difficult to recall.107 By way of 
 
 102. E.g., NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 
1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“NeoMagic argues, and we agree, that the court arrived 
at the constant voltage definition by examining the BIAS line of the accused 
device and, in effect, construing the claims to exclude it.”). 
 103. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“A claim is construed in the light of the claim language, 
the other claims, the prior art, the prosecution history, and the specification, 
not in light of the accused device.”). 
 104. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 105. See Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: 
An Experimental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1232 (1989) (“Better-in-
formed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their 
interest to do so; more information is not always better.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 422–28 (2007). 
 107. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93, at 1127. Although early research 
by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky relating to the availability heuristic 
focused on its effects in judging frequency and event likelihoods, see id., it has 
since been expanded to “social judgments in general.” Robert M. Reyes et al., 
Judgmental Biases Resulting from Differing Availabilities of Arguments, 39 J. 
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illustration, an argument presented in a vivid manner during 
trial is likely to have a greater impact on a juror’s assessment of 
the case than if the same argument had been presented less 
memorably.108 Given that patent-related proceedings at the PTO 
or in litigation are often complex and detail-intensive,109 infor-
mation that is readily available in memory or otherwise salient 
may disproportionately influence how a claim is construed. In 
addition, the presentation of claim construction arguments in a 
highly compact, concentrated form within a relatively short pe-
riod of time (e.g., a Federal Circuit appeal or a PTAB postgrant 
proceeding), as opposed to a sequential, drawn-out, evolving pro-
cess (e.g., district court litigation or patent prosecution),110 could 
lead to different adjudicated assessments of claim scope, depend-
ing on the extent to which the earliest or the most recently pre-
sented information achieves salience through primacy or recency 
effects, respectively.111 
2. Representativeness and Stereotyping 
The tendency of people to make systematic errors in judg-
ment regarding whether an item, X, is a member of a class, Y, 
has been attributed to the representativeness heuristic,112 which 
is grounded in the tendency to stereotype.113 This cognitive bias 
 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2, 3 (1980); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, 
at 142 (observing that other researchers have expanded the notion of availabil-
ity as a heuristic to contexts involving judging the importance of an idea by the 
fluency of recall). 
 108. Reyes et al., supra note 107, at 6 (reporting results of mock trial exper-
iment in which “arguments that were disproportionately recallable in memory 
had a correspondingly disproportionate impact on judgments of apparent 
guilt”). 
 109. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geo-
graphic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 933 (2001) (reporting 
data suggesting that “patent cases are more complex than the mass of civil case 
filings”); Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction 
from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 
(2004) (statement of Hon. Patti B. Saris) (“Patent litigation is like the neurosur-
gery of litigation: it is hard scientifically and it is hard legally.”). 
 110. Lefstin, Interpretive Regimes, supra note 56, at 1056–57 (outlining or-
der effects in claim construction). 
 111. A classic experiment on primacy and recency is provided in Norman 
Miller & Donald T. Campbell, Recency and Primacy in Persuasion as a Function 
of the Timing of Speeches and Measurements, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1 (1959) (using trial simulation to study the relationship between primacy and 
recency effects). A collection of citations reflecting the rich literature on this 
subject is provided in Lefstin, Interpretive Regimes, supra note 56, at 1056 n.90. 
 112. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, at 151–52, 156–59. 
 113. See id. at 156–59, 168. 
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arises when a person fails to evaluate whether X has the neces-
sary, essential characteristics of Y, and instead focuses on the 
degree to which X resembles a stereotypical member of class 
Y.114 For example, when people are asked to think about “birds” 
as a category, the stereotype is a robin, such that flightless birds 
like penguins and ostriches are not associated as strongly with 
that category.115 Stereotyping is a System 1 process whereby cat-
egories are represented by “prototypical exemplars,” in which 
“we hold in memory a representation of one or more ‘normal’ 
members of each of these categories.”116 Because System 1 pro-
cesses occur unconsciously and automatically,117 the deliberative 
process of System 2 may be necessary to go beyond the initial 
answer provided by stereotyping to properly categorize nonstere-
otypical items.118 
In the interpretation of claims, the effect of stereotyping 
may lead a reader to interpret a claim more narrowly than war-
ranted under the current claim construction regime. In most in-
stances, the stereotype that represents the scope of a claim 
would be the preferred embodiment of the invention described in 
the specification. If the reader’s System 2 is weak, the reader 
may not effectively parse the claim language to cover nonstereo-
typical items beyond the preferred embodiment. That is, a reader 
who is unable to fully engage in System 2 deliberation to me-
thodically parse the claim language (whether because of time 
constraints or lack of training in exegesis) may unconsciously 
rely on the preferred embodiment as the mental representation 
of the scope of a particular claim, thereby substantially narrow-
ing its scope. In this manner, it is possible that a time-pressed 
examiner may be unconsciously comparing the preferred embod-
iment—rather than the full scope of the claim—to the prior art, 
which would make it less likely that a claim will be found antic-
ipated or obvious. Likewise, a reader, such as an engineer, who 
is unschooled in the principles of claim construction may reach 
the conclusion that there is no infringement based on a compar-
 
 114. See id. at 151–52, 156–59, 168. 
 115. Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 
104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 192, 197–98, 232 (1975). 
 116. KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, at 168; see also Rosch, supra note 115, at 
225 (finding that “cognitive representations of categories appeared to be more 
similar to the good examples than the poor examples”). 
 117. KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, at 20–21. 
 118. Cf. id. (discussing how System 2 may interact with System 1). 
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ison of the accused product and the preferred embodiment, ra-
ther than the full scope of the claims according to the Phillips 
methodology. 
Notably, the nature of the claim language itself might ag-
gravate the tendency of readers to rely on the representativeness 
heuristic or stereotyping. Research suggests that concrete text is 
more memorable and more readily recalled than abstract text.119 
For example, in a study comparing sentence pairs such as “[t]he 
tribal marriage customs fascinated the tourists” and “[t]he tra-
ditional customs fascinated the tourists,” the former concrete 
version was recalled with greater accuracy than the latter ab-
stract version.120 This result holds across a variety of different 
subject matter, including technical information.121 This suggests 
that the preferred embodiment of the invention as set forth in 
the specification might be easier to recall than the claim lan-
guage—which, by its very nature, is an abstract description of 
the invention122 and thus imposes a higher cognitive load on the 
reader, as it must be parsed to form a mental representation. As 
Doug Lichtman has noted, “someone skilled in the art might find 
it easier to read simple, concrete claim language (‘shoelace’) ra-
ther than more abstract expressions (‘mechanism by which to 
 
 119. See ALLAN PAIVIO, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES 184 (1971) (re-
viewing studies suggesting that “recognition memory is a direct function of stim-
ulus concreteness: Recognition increases from abstract words, to concrete 
words, to pictures”); V. M. Holmes & J. Langford, Comprehension and Recall of 
Abstract and Concrete Sentences, 15 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 
559, 563 (1976) (reporting results demonstrating that “[c]oncrete sentences 
were comprehended significantly faster than abstract sentences”); Mark 
Sadoski et al., Impact of Concreteness on Comprehensibility, Interest, and 
Memory for Text: Implications for Dual Coding Theory and Text Design, 85 J. 
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 291, 301 (1993) (“Immediate and delayed recall of sentences 
and paragraphs of varying lengths revealed that concrete information was con-
sistently and overwhelmingly better recalled than abstract information,” 
whereby “concrete sentences were recalled about twice as well as abstract sen-
tences both immediately and 5 days later.”). 
 120. Richard C. Anderson et al., Two Faces of the Conceptual Peg Hypothesis, 
3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 142, 143, 148 (1977). 
 121. See Mark Sadoski et al., Engaging Texts: Effects of Concreteness on 
Comprehensibility, Interest, and Recall in Four Text Types, 92 J. EDUC. PSY-
CHOL. 85, 90–91 (2000) (reporting results of an experiment showing that for sci-
ence and math text, “[c]oncrete exposition was recalled 1.35 times as much as 
abstract exposition”). 
 122. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatent-
able Abstract Idea,” 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 50 (2011) (“Abstraction in 
the language of a patent claim is simply generality in the claim language. Here, 
claims become more abstract by describing an invention with more and more 
generality, and thus less and less detail, and encompassing a larger and larger 
set of distinct embodiments.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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bind tightly around the foot’) that are in fact technically supe-
rior.”123 
3. Egocentric Biases and Cognitive Dissonance 
How a person interprets information may be subject to “ego-
centric” or “self-serving” biases, which can be reflected in, for ex-
ample, an overestimation of one’s own abilities or an inflated 
view of the merits of one’s positions.124 Experimental studies 
suggest that lawyers’ views of the strengths or weaknesses of a 
case are heavily influenced by which side they represent.125 Re-
latedly, new information may be interpreted unconsciously in a 
way that supports or confirms preexisting beliefs; this is known 
as “confirmation bias.”126  
In the context of claim construction, egocentric biases may 
be pronounced in any reader who has to advocate for or other-
wise justify his or her interpretation. This is commonly reflected 
in the behaviors of the respective litigation counsel for the pa-
tentee and that of the accused infringer, both of whom parse the 
claim language using a selection of interpretive canons and 
sources that cast their respective positions in the best possible 
light. Although some variance is to be expected in the claim con-
struction positions taken by opposing litigators who are perform-
ing their jobs, egocentric biases can lead them to propose ex-
treme or unreasonable constructions that may involve “arguing 
vehemently about the thinnest shades of meanings of a patent’s 
[claim] terms.”127 
 
 123. See Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Re-
sponse to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2015 (2005). 
 124. See Guthrie, supra note 106, at 435–36. 
 125. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bar-
gaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337, 1341 (1995) (finding that “There was a strong 
tendency toward self-serving judgments of fairness and predictions of the 
judge’s award when subjects knew their roles”). 
 126. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polariza-
tion: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2106 (1979) (“Subjects’ decisions about 
whether to accept a study’s findings at face value or to search for flaws . . . 
seemed to depend . . . on whether the study’s results coincided with their exist-
ing beliefs.”); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenom-
enon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) (defining confirma-
tion bias as “unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence”). 
 127. Jessie Seyfer, Patent Judges Buried in Paper, RECORDER (Mar. 5, 2007). 
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The work product of judges may also be influenced by self-
serving biases, as they may have a strong interest in taking po-
sitions consistent with their prior rulings.128 Indeed, the desire 
for consistency might be a factor in how the PTAB analyzes claim 
scope during inter partes review. Because the same three-judge 
PTAB panel decides whether to institute an inter partes review 
proceeding and also decides the ultimate issue of patentability if 
a proceeding is instituted, some observers have attributed the 
PTAB’s high “kill rate”129 to possible confirmation bias on the 
part of the panel judges, as a finding of unpatentability would be 
consistent with their decision to institute review.130 Cognitive 
dissonance theory131 predicts that PTAB judges could be prone 
to discounting evidence and claim construction arguments that 
are inconsistent with their institution decisions.132 To the extent 
that confirmation bias may affect how PTAB judges construe 
claims during an inter partes review proceeding that has been 
instituted, the bias would likely exist toward interpreting claims 
broadly, which would increase the likelihood of an invalidity 
finding. 
 
 128. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUA-
SION 60 (2007) (noting the commonly-held perception that inconsistency is an 
undesirable personality trait); id. at 61 (observing that consistency is “a conven-
ient, relatively effortless, and efficient method for dealing with [complexity]”); 
see also Jeremy W. Bock, Restructuring the Federal Circuit, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. 
PROP. & ENT. L. 197, 221 (2014) [hereinafter Bock, Restructuring] (“[Incon-
sistency] could expose [judges] to the risk of losing face. . . . At the same time, it 
may take less work for a judge to default to his or her prior position . . . .”). 
 129. As of June 30, 2016, in inter partes review proceedings for which there 
was a final written decision, all claims were found unpatentable in seventy per-
cent of cases; some (but not all) claims were found unpatentable in fifteen per-
cent of cases; and none of the claims were found unpatentable in fourteen per-
cent of cases. PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 10 (June 30, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/2016-6-30%20PTAB.pdf. 
 130. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 826 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“[A]ssigning the same PTAB panel to both institute and conduct an inter partes 
review . . . has the taint of prejudgment. Many commentators, including the 
amici curiae in this case, point to the PTO’s own statistics as evidence of pre-
judgment, calling the merits phase ‘a largely rubber-stamp proceeding.’” (inter-
nal citation omitted)). 
 131. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3 
(1957). 
 132. Cf. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 780–81 (2002) (applying postdecision cognitive 
dissonance theory to argue that opposition proceedings should occur pregrant 
in order minimize the cognitive dissonance of PTO personnel). 
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B. PRIORS 
A reader’s background, experiences, and attitudes—in a 
word, her “priors”133—are the building blocks for her schemas, 
which may shape how she interprets a claim.134 A schema is 
one’s “organized knowledge of the world” that provides a contex-
tual framework for interpreting new information regarding a 
particular subject.135 An individual has numerous schemas cov-
ering a variety of topics. To illustrate how schemas operate, con-
sider the following sentence: “Number 37 knocked the cover off 
the ball.”136 To someone who is familiar with the game of base-
ball, this sentence may be readily interpreted as a baseball 
player wearing number thirty-seven on his jersey who hit the 
ball really hard, possibly scoring a home run.137 One who has a 
mental framework of details typically associated with baseball 
games—that is, a “baseball schema”—can readily comprehend 
this sentence, whereas someone without any familiarity with 
baseball may either have difficulty understanding the sentence 
without additional information, or, alternatively, may have a dif-
ferent schema that would allow him or her to reach a completely 
different interpretation (e.g., robotic sewing machine number 
thirty-seven malfunctioned and damaged a ball by ripping off its 
cover).138 
In the context of claim construction, priors and schemas may 
vary considerably from reader to reader, and their impact on in-
terpretation is discussed below. 
 
 133. In the literature, the term “priors” (or “prior”) is often used in the con-
text of discussing Bayes’s Theorem. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, On Convey-
ing the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and 
Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859, 863–64 (1996) (“According to Bayesian 
logic, one’s prior beliefs (i.e., the beliefs one holds prior to the introduction of 
new evidence) are combined with a quantitative measure of the probative value 
of the new evidence to form posterior beliefs.”). More generally, the term “priors” 
is also used in the literature to refer to a person’s “underlying assumptions and 
conceptual commitments.” Margaret Jane Radin, Of Priors and Of Disconnects, 
127 HARV. L. REV. F. 259, 260 (2014). Unless otherwise noted, the term “priors” 
is being used in this Article in the latter—more general—sense. 
 134. See Golden, supra note 37, at 330 (“It is well known that how a person 
. . . understands a legal document can depend strongly on that person’s mental 
framework and background knowledge.” (footnote omitted)). 
 135. Richard C. Anderson, Role of the Reader ’s Schema in Comprehension, 
Learning, and Memory, in THEORETICAL MODELS AND PROCESSES OF READING 
476, 476–79 (Donna E. Alvermann et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013). 
 136. Id. at 476–77 (providing similar example). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. 
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1. Technical Background 
Readers with technical expertise relating to a particular 
technology may have developed various schemas relating to that 
subject. And like the people who understand the “Number 37” 
sentence in the context of baseball, technically knowledgeable 
readers may unconsciously read into the claims extra details or 
assumptions furnished by their schemas, which may not be ap-
parent to someone who lacks the requisite technical expertise. 
As such, it is possible that someone with technical expertise may 
be prone to interpreting certain claims more narrowly than 
someone without such knowledge. 
For example, the proliferation of functional claims in issued 
patents, especially those relating to software,139 suggests that 
examiners do not notice defects in the disclosure requirement140 
as often as they should. The prevalence of this failure suggests 
that there may be an unconscious aspect to it, whereby an exam-
iner’s technical priors may be routinely filling in the gaps in a 
vague or overbroad claim, such that he fails to recognize poten-
tial indefiniteness, written description, or enablement issues. A 
claim written in thinly veiled functional language intended to 
avoid the application of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) that is accompanied 
by a bare-bones disclosure may look overly broad and inchoate, 
especially to someone who is not steeped in the context of the 
invention or the relevant technical field. However, this same 
claim and disclosure may look more substantive and “fleshed 
out” to an examiner who is viewing it through the lens formed 
by synthesizing the ex parte arguments provided by the patent 
attorney regarding the invention, the examiner’s own familiar-
ity with the technical field through his education, and the sheer 
quantity of prior art to which he has been exposed as part of his 
daily work activities. In essence, where others might see only a 
random assortment of dots, the examiner may discern a clear 
shape, in which the dots conform to some pattern in a context to 
which the examiner has been routinely exposed or immersed. 
And because patent examination is ex parte, there is no opposing 
party who could provide debiasing information that might chal-
lenge the examiner’s perception that a claim is clearer than it 
actually is. Consequently, where extra features have been un-
 
 139. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Address, Software Patents and the Re-
turn of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 [hereinafter Lemley, Func-
tional Claiming] (discussing the issues associated with broad functional claims). 
 140. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
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consciously read in by the “expert” examiner in the course of ex-
amination—thereby making the claims appear narrower and/or 
adequately supported—the resulting claim (as issued) might be 
viewed as overly broad when later construed by others who do 
not share the examiner’s priors. 
2. Legal Background 
Those who are familiar with the best practices and the lin-
guistic mannerisms of patent attorneys in claiming inventions 
are likely to interpret claims differently from those do not pos-
sess this specialized knowledge.141 For example, what an inven-
tor and his patent attorney see when reading the same claim is 
likely to be different: the inventor, who is usually a layperson, 
might discern only a specific embodiment without appreciating 
the fact that the claim might have been written at a more ab-
stract level to encompass additional embodiments and potential 
variations.142 Indeed, it is not uncommon for an inventor to have 
difficulty figuring out what the claims cover in his own patent.143 
More generally, a reader who has legal training—and for 
whom exegesis is a fundamental, acquired skill—may be more 
inclined to parse claim language than a lay reader.144 Lawyers 
are trained to closely evaluate the meaning of individual words 
and are acquainted with the basic rules of statutory construction 
and contract interpretation. They are also socialized to look for 
 
 141. See Golden, supra note 37, at 336–40 (describing specialized, legalistic 
nature of claim construction). 
 142. See George F. Wheeler, Creative Claim Drafting: Claim Drafting Strat-
egies, Specification Preparation, and Prosecution Tactics, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 34, 53 (2003) (“[T]ake pains to write the broadest available 
claims. Write many independent claims, each ideally having a different, single 
distinction over the closest prior art. Do not stop until you have the broadest 
available claims of all available types.”); Donald A. Streck, Choosing the Right 
Patent Attorney for Today’s Technology, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Mar. 1996, at 24, 
24 (“[T]he patent attorney’s challenge is to ‘help’ the inventor think of the alter-
nate embodiments and improvements on their own. This can sometimes be very 
frustrating when you can see three other embodiments and the client inventor 
insists that there are no more.”). 
 143. See, e.g., When Patents Attack, NPR: PLANET MONEY (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents 
-attack (reporting remarks from a computer programmer who says his own soft-
ware patents are “mumbo jumbo that nobody understands and makes no sense 
from an engineering standpoint whatsoever”). 
 144. In deciding that claim construction should be a question of law, the Su-
preme Court pointed to the jury’s lack of training in exegesis. Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (noting that the “construc-
tion of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are 
likely to do better than” those who are “unburdened by training in exegesis”). 
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errors in a body of text.145 As such, an individual with legal train-
ing may be unconsciously prone to engaging in some form of 
parsing when reading a claim. The extent and quality of the 
parsing may be a further variable as it could depend on an indi-
vidual’s specific training and experience in patent law, along 
with situational considerations, such as workload and time con-
straints.146 
In contrast, for a lay reader, parsing may not typically in-
form the unconscious processes that influence claim interpreta-
tion, such that the description of the preferred embodiments in 
the specification is likely to serve as the primary—if not exclu-
sive—point of reference when ascertaining claim scope. For read-
ers who engage in minimal parsing or none at all, it is possible 
that a claim may simply act as a skeleton on which the disclosed 
embodiments are draped. 
3. Personal Attitudes 
A reader’s priors may give rise to personal attitudes, prefer-
ences, and opinions (e.g., toward the subject matter, the parties, 
the circumstances) that may influence how the reader construes 
a claim. And where likes and dislikes are involved, System 2 can 
act as “an apologist for the emotions of System 1,” rather than 
as a moderator, and seek information and arguments in support 
thereof.147 This can give rise to “motivated reasoning,” whereby 
people reason their way to a preferred conclusion, “with their 
preferences influencing the way evidence is gathered, arguments 
are processed, and memories of past experience are recalled.”148 
As Judge Alex Kozinski has acknowledged, judges have “bi-
ases, interests, leanings, [and] instincts,” and they need to fight 
the impulse to “take sides in a case and subtly shade the deci-
sion-making process.”149 A notable illustration of the impact of 
personal attitudes is provided in a study that reveals how the 
 
 145. See, e.g., Jeff Lipshaw, A Lawyer Reads an Ad . . . Or Are Parsers Peo-
ple?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 21, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2016/09/a-lawyer-reads-an-ad-or-are-parsers-people-1.html. 
 146. See infra Part II.C. 
 147. KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, at 103–04. 
 148. Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Mechanics of Motivated Rea-
soning, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 133 (2016); see also Ziva Kunda, The Case for 
Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990) (observing that “mo-
tivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive pro-
cesses”). 
 149. Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial 
Decision Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 997 (1993). 
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Federal Circuit judges’ level of familiarity (or affinity) with the 
district judge whose claim construction is under review may in-
fluence whether the district court’s claim construction is af-
firmed.150 Specifically, Mark Lemley and Shawn Miller found 
that for district judges who sat by designation at the Federal 
Circuit, their reversal rates on subsequent claim construction 
appeals decreased by fifty percent,151 and that this result was 
unlikely to be attributable to learning effects.152 
Personal attitudes may also be shaped by a reader’s experi-
ences. A study by Mark Lemley, Su Li, and Jennifer Urban re-
veals that district judges who are highly experienced with patent 
cases tend to rule against the patentee on infringement issues 
by a statistically significant margin compared to judges with less 
patent case experience.153 Based on these results, Lemley and 
his coauthors surmise that judges who are experienced with pa-
tent cases may be more skeptical of patentees’ arguments that 
they are entitled to broad claims.154 Surprisingly, this result also 
largely holds for the district judges of the Eastern District of 
Texas,155 despite their alleged “forum selling” behavior in which 
they try to attract patent cases to their district by adopting pro-
cedures favorable to patentees.156 
Claim interpretation may also be affected by the individual 
philosophies and attitudes of a judge157 on topics such as: the 
 
 150. See Mark A. Lemley & Shawn P. Miller, If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join 
’Em? How Sitting by Designation Affects Judicial Behavior, 94 TEX. L. REV. 451 
(2016). 
 151. Id. at 451. 
 152. Id. at 473 (“Both judges who heard claim construction cases on appeal 
and those who didn’t benefitted from the after-designation effect in their subse-
quent claim construction appeals. . . . This suggests that neither substantive 
learning about claim construction nor even learning what Federal Circuit 
judges like to read in a claim construction opinion are at work . . . .”). 
 153. Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges 
Deciding Patent Cases?, 66 STAN L. REV. 1121, 1121, 1140–44 (2014). 
 154. Id. at 1151–52. 
 155. Id. at 1154. 
 156. Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 
241 (2016); see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 635–36 (2015). 
 157. See Thomas W. Krause & Heather F. Auyang, What Close Cases and 
Reversals Reveal About Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit, 12 J. MAR-
SHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 584–85 (2013) (noting that in close cases, pref-
erences or tendencies of Federal Circuit judges may be revealed). 
 1302 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1273 
 
proper role of the specification in claim construction (procedur-
alist vs. holistic);158 the degree of deference to be accorded to trial 
courts;159 and the extent to which patent rights are properly bal-
anced in relation to the public interest.160 For example, wide-
spread complaints and negative public opinion about patent as-
sertion entities, particularly in the high-technology industries, 
may be affecting the Federal Circuit’s assessment of the proper 
claim scope in certain cases161: according to a study by Christo-
pher Cotropia that looked at cases from 2010 to 2013, claim con-
structions that resulted in patentee wins at the district court 
level were disproportionally likely to be overturned on appeal if 
the patent related to electronics, information technology, or busi-
ness methods.162 
It is possible that the impact of individual judicial philoso-
phies and preferences on claim scope might be more pronounced 
at the Federal Circuit than either at the PTO or at the district 
court level because the readers in those subordinate tribunals 
operate under a greater likelihood of having their constructions 
reviewed by a superior tribunal and potentially overruled, as 
claim construction is a question of law that is reviewed de 
novo.163 In contrast, for Federal Circuit judges, the likelihood of 
review by a superior tribunal (i.e., the U.S. Supreme Court) is 
relatively low,164 such that they may feel less constrained in hav-
ing their preferences and attitudes reflected in their decisions. 
C. SITUATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A reader’s interpretation of a claim may also be affected by 
his environment. This is termed “situationism,” which is a 
“strain of social psychology that suggests that human behavior 
is commonly the product of the situations in which people find 
 
 158. Wagner & Petherbridge, Federal Circuit Succeeding, supra note 45; see 
also Krause & Auyang, supra note 157, at 594–95. 
 159. Krause & Auyang, supra note 157, at 596–97. 
 160. Cf. id. at 596 (noting that, for some judges, “pro-patent votes closely 
correlate to broader claim interpretations”). 
 161. Cf. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the 
Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
263, 265–67 tbl.1 (2010) (summarizing literature on multivariate studies on the 
effect of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions). 
 162. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Review: Deference 
or Correction Driven?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1095, 1113–17 (2014) [hereinafter Co-
tropia, Deference]. 
 163. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 164. See infra note 203. 
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themselves, more so than their own underlying personalities.”165 
Resource constraints (such as time and money), the conse-
quences of failure, whether the decisionmaker is an individual 
or a group, and other environmental characteristics, could all po-
tentially impact the analysis of claim language by making the 
reader more (or less) susceptible to cognitive biases by weaken-
ing (or strengthening) the ability of System 2 to monitor Sys-
tem 1’s conclusions,166 or more (or less) prone to engaging in mo-
tivated reasoning to reach a desired outcome.167 More generally, 
situational considerations may give rise to “satisficing” (as op-
posed to “optimizing”) behavior168 in arriving at a claim con-
struction: a reader may well decide that his or her interpretation 
of a claim is “good enough” in light of competing priorities. 
1. Docket Pressures 
Claim interpretation might be influenced by a reader’s 
workload in a couple of ways. First, the quality of parsing may 
be affected: a time-pressed reader who manages a heavy docket 
might be prone to relying on heuristics instead of undertaking 
the cognitively intensive, deliberative act of parsing. Second, if a 
certain interpretation is likely to lighten a reader’s workload by 
either simplifying the analysis or hastening the resolution of a 
matter, whereas an alternative interpretation would complicate 
or prolong it, the reader might find the arguments supporting 
the former more compelling—at an unconscious level—than the 
arguments supporting the latter. 
By way of illustration, docket pressures169 might prompt ex-
aminers to unconsciously favor narrower interpretations. A 
 
 165. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675, 1690 (2011). See generally LEE ROSS 
& RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991) (synthesizing 
research on situational determinants of human behavior). 
 166. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 91, at 41–44 (describing the impact of ego 
depletion on System 2); id. at 97–99 (discussing how “a lazy System 2” adopts 
the answer provided by System 1). 
 167. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Envi-
ronment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 129, 136–37 (1956). 
 169. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1495, 1496 n.3 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance] 
(“[T]here are strong structural and psychological pressures on examiners to is-
sue patents rather than reject applications . . . .”). 
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high-volume application-processing operation may leave an ex-
aminer little time170 to fully parse the claims using BRI and con-
sider the full range of possibilities beyond the disclosed embodi-
ments, which is a deliberative process that imposes a high 
cognitive load.171 Instead, through a combination of heuristics 
and priors, an examiner’s assessment of claim scope is likely to 
correspond to a stereotypical image of the invention based on the 
preferred embodiment, as discussed previously.172 That is, an ex-
aminer may be allowing an initial quick—but narrow—answer 
generated by System 1 to remain unexamined (and uncorrected) 
by the deliberative processes of System 2. This may cause exam-
iners to perceive claims as narrower than the full scope derived 
by applying BRI, thereby decreasing the likelihood that a claim 
would be deemed unpatentable in view of the prior art or a lack 
of support in the disclosure.173 Moreover, a narrow reading of the 
claim may be unconsciously appealing to an examiner because it 
would render a claim patentable, thereby advancing the prose-
cution of the application to its conclusion and disposal.174 In con-
trast, a broad interpretation could prolong the proceedings be-
cause the likelihood of an unpatentability determination would 
increase, which may lead to the filing of a Request for Continued 
Examination, a continuation application, or a PTAB appeal.175 
 
 170. See id. (“Examiners have astonishingly little time to spend on each ap-
plication—on average, a total of eighteen hours . . . .”); Michael D. Frakes & 
Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications In-
ducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Microlevel Applica-
tion Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550 app. tbl.A1 (2017). 
 171. Several empirical studies suggest that examiners avoid time-consum-
ing work in a manner that impacts patent quality. See Christopher A. Cotropia 
et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 851 (2013) (re-
porting results suggesting that an examiner is more likely to rely exclusively on 
his own search results without substantively considering the prior art submis-
sions of the applicant); Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 170, at 560 (“Our anal-
ysis finds that as examiners are given less time to review applications upon 
certain types of promotions, the less prior art they cite, the less likely they are 
to make time-consuming obviousness rejections, and the more likely they are to 
grant patents.”). 
 172. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.1. 
 173. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 174. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 169 (“[T]he only way for an 
examiner to guarantee that an application is finally disposed of is to issue a 
patent. Examiners who want credit for dispositions therefore have a strong in-
centive to issue patents to persistent applicants, rather than to continue reject-
ing the applications.”). 
 175. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examina-
tion, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, para. 18 (listing the options available to patent 
applicants for extending prosecution). 
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Similar considerations may affect the manner in which dis-
trict judges construe claims, but to a different degree. Like a pa-
tent examiner, a district judge manages a heavy docket of 
cases.176 However, unlike a patent examiner, a district judge is 
provided with adversarial briefing, which can ease the cognitive 
burden of exploring interpretive possibilities under the current 
claim construction regime that may require claim scope to ex-
tend substantially beyond the preferred embodiments. Thus, to 
the extent that a heavy docket may adversely affect a reader’s 
proclivity to engage in System 2 deliberation, it may have a 
much stronger impact on an examiner than on a district judge. 
The primary manner in which a heavy docket, in and of itself, 
might influence a district judge’s claim interpretation could, in-
stead, be in the selection of an interpretation that would sub-
stantially streamline the case or hasten its termination.177 For 
example, if a narrow interpretation could support a noninfringe-
ment ruling that would dispose of multiple claims or even the 
entire case via summary judgment or settlement,178 a district 
judge might find, unconsciously, the arguments in favor of a nar-
row interpretation more compelling than the arguments in favor 
of a broad one.  
For PTAB judges, it is possible that the impact of docket 
pressure on claim construction might be the most acute before 
the institution of a postgrant proceeding, such as inter partes 
review. The PTAB has deadlines set by statute for completing 
 
 176. According to one estimate, the average number of new incoming cases 
per district judge was 388 during a twelve-month period from July 1, 2013 to 
June 30, 2014. AS WORKLOADS RISE IN FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGE COUNTS RE-
MAIN FLAT, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/364. 
 177. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND RE-
FORM 178–79 (1996) (observing that the “pressure of a growing caseload has 
resulted in streamlining or corner cutting” in the district courts, which “try to 
dispose of civil cases at earlier stages in the litigation, as by granting summary 
judgment or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim”). 
 178. See John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent 
Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1789–90 (2014) (explaining how it is easier for 
a court to dispose of a case through a summary judgment ruling in favor of the 
defendant, rather than one in favor of the patentee). Although a patentee might 
seek a narrow interpretation to avoid prior art, it is far more likely that the 
party advocating a narrow construction is the accused infringer who is seeking 
to prove noninfringement, which, compared to invalidity, is less burdensome for 
an accused infringer to prove: noninfringement may be proven by showing the 
absence of a single element by a preponderance, rather than showing that every 
element is present in the prior art to invalidate a claim by clear and convincing 
evidence. See id. 
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postgrant proceedings179 under the America Invents Act 
(AIA).180 As such, the PTAB judges may have an interest in keep-
ing the number of proceedings manageable in order to be able to 
meet those deadlines. Given that the decision whether to insti-
tute an AIA proceeding is unappealable,181 denying petitions for 
review may provide the PTAB judges with an effective mecha-
nism for directly managing their workload.182 For example, a 
PTAB panel could avoid instituting an inter partes review (and 
the resulting follow-on work)183 by finding there is no “reasona-
ble likelihood” that the petitioner would prevail as to any of the 
challenged claims,184 based on a narrow reading of the claims 
that avoids invalidity. This possibility—that the PTAB judges 
may be unconsciously reading the claims narrowly to make it 
less likely that a claim would be found invalid in order to deny 
petitions so as to control their workload—might be a factor con-
tributing to the progressive decrease in the institution rate for 
postgrant proceedings,185 apart from other reasons such as pre-
institution settlements and the quality of petitions.186 Once an 
inter partes review has been instituted, it is possible that the 
opposite directional bias might affect the PTAB panel’s claim 
 
 179. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012) (specifying that “the final determination 
in an inter partes review be issued not later than 1 year after the date on which 
the Director notices the institution of a review . . . except that the Director may, 
for good cause shown, extend the 1-year period by not more than 6 months”). 
 180. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 181. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“The determination by the Director whether to in-
stitute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappeala-
ble.”). 
 182. PERKINS COIE, INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCEEDINGS: A FOURTH ANNI-
VERSARY REPORT 8 (2016), https://issuu.com/perkinscoie/docs/ipr_anniversary_ 
report_4_final [hereinafter PERKINS COIE REPORT] (“One possible explanation 
for this decrease in institution rate is the overwhelming popularity of IPRs. A 
lower rate of institution allows the PTAB to control its workload to meet the 18-
month statutory deadline for issuance of final written decisions.”). 
 183. At the PTAB, the same panel of judges who handle the institution deci-
sion also preside over the proceeding after institution. See Ethicon Endo-Sur-
gery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 826 F.3d 1366, 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, 
J., dissenting). 
 184. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
 185. See Tony Dutra, Increase in PTAB Petition Denials Shows Shift in Abil-
ity to Defend Challenged Patents, 92 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 860, 860 
(2016) (“Data from Bloomberg BNA[] . . . through May 31, 2016, show the board 
denied inter partes review (IPR) petitions . . . at a rate of about 34 percent in 
the most recent year, and 29 percent in the preceding year. That compares to 
about 18 percent in the PTAB’s early days.”). 
 186. See, e.g., PERKINS COIE REPORT, supra note 182, at 8–9. 
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construction: instead of an unconscious preference for a narrow 
interpretation (as in the preinstitution stage), confirmation bias 
may influence the postinstitution claim interpretation such that 
the panel might favor a broad interpretation that would support 
a finding of invalidity—thereby confirming the panel’s decision 
to institute the proceeding.187 
Unlike the proceedings at the district court or at the PTAB, 
the directionality of claim interpretation (i.e., broad versus nar-
row) might not have a substantial or predictable effect on the 
Federal Circuit’s workload, given that most appeals are, by com-
parison, relatively compact proceedings involving only a single 
round of briefing and oral argument followed by a disposition.188 
To the extent that claim construction could meaningfully impact 
the Federal Circuit’s workload, it may arise from its disposition, 
rather than its directionality; that is, whether the claim con-
struction under review is being affirmed or not. Compared to re-
versals or modifications of the judgment below, affirmances may 
require less work because they may borrow the reasoning of the 
decision under review or, in some cases, may be decided sum-
marily without opinion.189 It is possible then, that a Federal Cir-
cuit panel’s interpretation of a claim could be influenced by the 
panel members’ desire to alleviate their workload through affir-
mance: the judges who feel their workload is unusually heavy 
might find, unconsciously, the arguments in favor of affirmance 
to be more convincing.190 
However, it is not clear whether a claim construction that 
has been modified—or is otherwise the product of intense delib-
erative reasoning by a panel of Federal Circuit judges as set 
forth in a written opinion—is necessarily more reliable than a 
construction that has been summarily affirmed without opinion. 
Ostensibly, the Federal Circuit judges have the lightest docket 
pressure among the three types of judicial readers discussed 
thus far, as they do not have heavy individual loads like district 
 
 187. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 188. A case may return to the Federal Circuit after an appeal from a remand, 
see, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1373–77 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), but such cases are infrequent. 
 189. See FED. CIR. R. 36. 
 190. See POSNER, supra note 177, at 345 (“[O]ne consequence of the heavy 
caseload pressures on the courts of appeals has been an increase in the defer-
ence paid by those courts to the rulings made by district judges.”); see also Bert 
I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1114–15 (2011) (report-
ing results of empirical study showing that the civil appeal reversal rate de-
creased in appellate courts that experienced a workload surge or multiple judi-
cial vacancies). 
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judges and are not subject to statutorily set deadlines for dispo-
sitions like PTAB judges. This, along with their extensive expe-
rience with patent-specific exegesis, might place Federal Circuit 
judges in the best position to undertake the cognitively inten-
sive, deliberative process to parse a claim in a manner that ex-
plores the full range of interpretive options. However, when Fed-
eral Circuit judges engage in deliberative reasoning—thereby 
resisting reliance on the quick, heuristic-generated answers pro-
vided by System 1—other behavioral elements, such as their pri-
ors,191 may still affect the outcome when they are ratified and 
rationalized via System 2, as suggested by the phenomenon of 
panel dependence.192 
2. Stakes and Consequences 
For examiners, taking cognitive shortcuts—which can yield 
artificially narrow claim scope193—is relatively low-cost and low-
risk because an error associated with an individual patent (let 
alone an individual claim) is unlikely to materially affect their 
work or status at the PTO. Given the application backlog, exam-
iners are evaluated primarily on their docket management 
skills,194 rather than on the quality of their examination.195 Be-
cause of organizational difficulties associated with reliably en-
forcing quality control at the PTO,196 the consequences for allow-
ing defective claims to issue may not be imminent for examiners, 
and are thus likely to be substantially discounted by them.197 
More generally, the likelihood that an error in claim scope will 
be discovered is extremely low, given that relatively few issued 
patents are carefully read, let alone asserted and tested in 
 
 191. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 192. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.1, II.C.1. 
 194. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., USPTO 
NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN PATENT QUALITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES 4–9 (Apr. 10, 
2015), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-15-026-A.pdf. 
 195. For example, in fiscal years 2011 through 2013, the PTO issued written 
warnings on docket-related issues to hundreds of examiners, while issuing writ-
ten warnings on quality issues to only seven examiners. Id. at 8–9. 
 196. See id. at 6–7 (suggesting that supervisors may be reluctant to under-
take the time- and labor-intensive process associated with formally charging 
errors based on quality issues). 
 197. Cf. Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1539 (“[I]mpatience is very strong for 
near rewards (and aversion very strong for near punishments) but . . . each of 
these declines over time—a pattern referred to as ‘hyperbolic discounting.’” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
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court.198 Accordingly, the stakes may not be high enough for an 
examiner to undertake the effort to thoroughly parse claim lan-
guage under BRI. 
By comparison, the PTAB judges who preside over postissu-
ance proceedings do not process a high volume of low-stakes pa-
tents for which errors are unlikely to be noticed. Rather, most of 
the patents the PTAB judges handle in those proceedings either 
have been or have a high likelihood of being litigated,199 such 
that a substantial likelihood of appeal exists.200 Concerns about 
reversal aversion201 may thus prompt PTAB judges to commit 
more cognitive resources than an examiner to closely parsing 
claim language to ascertain the full extent of what would be 
deemed the “broadest reasonable construction” of a claim. 
Similarly, litigation counsel, district judges, and Federal 
Circuit judges may undertake more effortful parsing than exam-
iners because their constructions are subject to close scrutiny by 
clients, other tribunals, and the public. These readers operate in 
high-stakes, adversarial proceedings in which their reputations 
may be affected by their performance—to varying degrees. For 
example, district judges, according to Jeffrey Lefstin, may be 
more “personally accountable for their judgments” than Federal 
Circuit judges, as the former directly bear the impact of their 
 
 198. For example, in 2014, the PTO issued 300,677 utility patents. U.S. Pa-
tent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2015, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last up-
dated June 15, 2016). That year, according to an estimate by the PTO’s Office 
of Chief Economist, there were over 2.5 million utility patents in force. Alan C. 
Marco et al., The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files: Two Centuries of Inno-
vation 17, 32 fig.6 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Working Paper No. 2015-
1, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616724. Of these, 4922 utility patents (i.e., 
0.2% of all utility patents in force at the time) were asserted in patent suits filed 
in U.S. district courts in 2014, according to a June 27, 2017 search on DOCKET 
NAVIGATOR, https://www.docketnavigator.com.  
 199. See HARNESS DICKEY, A Look at Fifty-One Months of Inter Partes Re-
view Proceedings Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, in 16 
HARNESSING PATENT OFFICE LITIGATION 1 (2017), http://ipr-pgr.com/wp 
-content/uploads/2017/03/IPR-PGR-Report-Vol.-16.pdf (reporting that from 
September 16, 2012, to December 16, 2016, seventy-nine percent of inter partes 
review proceedings involved patents litigated concurrently in district court). 
 200. See Vin Gurrieri, Fed. Circ. Can Handle Crush of PTAB Appeals, 
LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/767352. 
 201. See Joanna Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal 
Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1753, 
1759 (2011) (“[A]lthough the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the major-
ity of recent studies find that self-interest concerns, such as promotion desires 
and reversal aversion, influence the decisionmaking of judges with permanent 
tenure.”). 
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decisions on case-management issues and cannot hide behind a 
panel.202 Compared to district judges and PTAB judges, Federal 
Circuit judges are highly unlikely to have their claim construc-
tions reviewed by a superior tribunal (which, for the Federal Cir-
cuit, is the U.S. Supreme Court),203 such that reversal aversion 
may be less of a concern than their self-image,204 their legacy,205 
and the bar’s opinion of them.206 This might allow the personal 
attitudes of each panel member,207 as well as the interpersonal 
dynamics within the panel,208 to play a larger role in influencing 
the construction, as evidenced by, for example, the doctrinal 
schism between the proceduralists and the holistics, and the re-
sulting panel dependence in claim construction dispositions.209 
While raising the stakes (or enhancing the severity of the 
consequences for being incorrect) may prompt readers to engage 
in more effortful, deliberative attempts at claim construction, 
they may not always yield a construction that is more consistent 
among different readers or more accurate (however defined), as 
some readers may engage in motivated reasoning to suit their 
agendas or circumstances. In addition, some behavioral phenom-
ena, such as anchoring, may be largely unaffected by incentives 
for accuracy.210 In an experiment with a group of administrative 
law judges, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew 
 
 202. Lefstin, Interpretive Regimes, supra note 56, at 1057. 
 203. See The Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 
2018) (“Each Term, approximately 7,000–8,000 new cases are filed in the Su-
preme Court. . . . Plenary review, with oral arguments by attorneys, is currently 
granted in about 80 of those cases each Term, and the Court typically disposes 
of about 100 or more cases without plenary review.”). 
 204. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 205. Cf. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals and Politicians: The Uncertain 
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 290, 290 (2010) (reporting results of empirical study of state high court 
opinions that suggest “elected judges focus on providing service to the voters, 
whereas appointed judges care more about their long-term legacy as creators of 
precedent”). 
 206. Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the 
Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
559, 561 (2010) (observing that empirical study of the law on obviousness sug-
gests that “statistically speaking, the Federal Circuit in particular and judges 
in general may be surprisingly sensitive to criticism coming from the practicing 
bar and academia”). 
 207. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 208. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 209. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 210. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93, at 1128 (“Payoffs for accuracy did 
not reduce the anchoring effect.”). 
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Wistrich found that the presence or absence of accountability in 
their damage awards had no appreciable impact on the power of 
anchoring.211 
3. Group Deliberation 
Group deliberation may have the effect, in some cases, of de-
biasing or mitigating the effects of cognitive biases. The impact 
of the heuristics and priors discussed in previous Sections may 
be the most salient when viewed with respect to the decisions of 
one individual. The decision of a group, by contrast, might reflect 
a melding of interpretations or the selection of a consensus 
choice among multiple options, as the author of an opinion has 
to make a conscious effort to win over at least one other judge on 
a three-judge panel. This may mute the influence of certain in-
dividual personal characteristics: according to an empirical 
study by Kimberly Moore, an individual Federal Circuit judge’s 
technical background, prior patent-related experience, or politi-
cal affiliation (as measured by the party of the appointing presi-
dent) has no statistically significant relationship with the likeli-
hood that a claim construction decision would be affirmed or 
reversed.212 
In considering the effects of group deliberation, it might be 
helpful to compare PTAB judges with examiners. PTAB judges 
reach decisions as a panel with three members. Compared to the 
work of an individual patent examiner, the act of collective de-
liberation by a PTAB panel may help mitigate the influence of 
each member’s individual priors, as well as distribute the cogni-
tive load of parsing text. As such, when the authoring judge of a 
PTAB opinion interprets a claim under BRI, he or she may be 
less likely than an examiner to adopt the “easy” answer sug-
gested by his or her cognitive biases by virtue of the fact that a 
single judge cannot make a decision alone, and must convince at 
least one other judge through arguments that require delibera-
tive reasoning under System 2. Because the PTAB judges are 
more likely to engage in a deliberative analysis of claim scope 
under BRI, their assessment of scope is likely to be broader—
thereby rendering the claim more susceptible to invalidation—
than that of an examiner. In this manner, the relative influence 
of a single individual’s cognitive biases on claim interpretation 
 
 211. Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examina-
tion of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1503–06 (2009). 
 212. Moore, supra note 40, at 26–27. 
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is likely to be attenuated in a PTAB panel decision when com-
pared to an office action prepared by an individual examiner. 
Although group deliberation might mitigate some behav-
ioral elements, it may amplify others. For example, when partic-
ular attitudes are shared by several members of a group, it may 
be reinforced. A study by Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, and 
Lisa Michelle Ellman reveals that group deliberation can result 
in more extreme results through an amplification effect based on 
panel composition: panels staffed by appointees of a single polit-
ical party were found to rule in ways that were more extreme 
than if the panel composition were mixed.213 Group deliberation 
also introduces group dynamics, whereby the group’s desire to 
maintain collegiality and each individual’s desire to minimize 
work may influence the ultimate construction adopted.214 In-
deed, a judge who is sitting with other judges on a panel may go 
along with a suboptimal construction because it entails less work 
than dissenting or attempting to change the authoring judge’s 
mind.215 
At the Federal Circuit, panel dependence on claim construc-
tion issues is a well-known phenomenon that reflects the exist-
ence of two distinct camps of judges: the proceduralists and the 
holistics.216 Although the individual backgrounds of Federal Cir-
cuit judges may not appreciably affect how they may construe 
claims during group deliberations,217 it appears as if the extent 
to which the judges on a panel share case-related judicial philos-
ophies, attitudes, and preferences218 may influence the outcome. 
Like the Federal Circuit judges, the PTAB judges who deliberate 
as a panel may also experience similar group-specific behavioral 
artifacts that may affect their claim interpretations. However, 
the extent to which such artifacts may create panel dependence 
at the PTAB might be tempered by the comparatively higher 
likelihood of review by a superior tribunal.219 
 
 213. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: 
A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304–05 (2004). 
 214. Cf. Bock, Restructuring, supra note 128, at 222–25 (discussing how col-
legiality concerns may influence judicial behavior). 
 215. Cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The 
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 20–21 (1993) (dis-
cussing “going along” voting and “live and let live” opinion joining). 
 216. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 217. Moore, supra note 40, at 26–27. 
 218. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 219. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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In short, to the extent that debiasing can occur in panels of 
judges, it is imperfect and somewhat unreliable. In addition, the 
final result may still be highly variable because the parsing is 
performed not by one person but rather by three who, in the ag-
gregate, can conceive of a greater number of possible interpreta-
tions—from which the selection of the group’s preferred inter-
pretation may be influenced by not only the behavioral elements 
of each individual panel member, but also group-specific behav-
ioral artifacts. 
D. READER COMPARISON 
For each type of reader, it is likely that a combination of be-
havioral elements may affect how she interprets a claim. The in-
fluence of one behavioral element may not necessarily point in 
the same direction as another with respect to claim scope: some 
behavioral elements may push the reader toward a narrow in-
terpretation, while others may push for a broader one. For ex-
ample, a patent litigation attorney with an extensive technical 
background who is representing the patentee may endeavor to 
read the claims as broadly as possible and may unconsciously 
discount strong arguments to the contrary. But, at the same 
time, she may have a tendency to unconsciously fill in extra tech-
nical details (based on her technical priors) when reading the 
claim, thereby leading her to formulate an interpretation that is 
somewhat narrower than that reached by a colleague on her 
team who has no technical background. In addition, the likeli-
hood that a reader may adopt the heuristic-generated answer of 
System 1 without further modification by the deliberative pro-
cesses of System 2, or find certain arguments unconsciously com-
pelling, may depend not only on his priors but also on the cir-
cumstances (i.e., the situational characteristics) under which he 
or she is reading the claim. 
Table 1 lists several different categories of readers and com-
pares them across several major personal and situational char-
acteristics that may affect their behavioral elements, which, in 
turn, may influence how they construe claims. In addition to the 
specific readers listed, there are countless other readers who 
may be anyone—from a lay member of the public to a former 
PTO commissioner who serves as a mediator for patent suits. 
The list of characteristics in Table 1 is not exhaustive. A 
comparison of multiple readers who are operating under the 
same claim construction rules reveals that no two reader types 
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share the same characteristics. For example, the Phillips meth-
odology is applied by litigators, district judges, and Federal Cir-
cuit judges—all of whom have different combinations of charac-
teristics that may influence how their behavioral elements may 
affect their view of claim scope. The same observation may be 
made for the readers who apply BRI (i.e., patent attorneys, ex-
aminers, litigators in PTO proceedings, PTAB judges, and Fed-
eral Circuit judges in PTO appeals). Further heterogeneity may 
exist within each reader type, where variance in the skill levels 
of individuals may affect the extent and quality of their parsing. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Reader Characteristics 
 
 Inventor 
Pat. 
Att’y 
PTO 
Exam’r Litigator 
DCT 
Judge 
PTAB 
Judge 
CAFC 
Judge 
Rules of Claim 
Interpretation 
N/A BRI BRI 
Phillips/ 
BRI 
Phillips BRI 
Phillips/ 
BRI 
Knowledge re: 
Invention & 
 Inventor Intent 
Highest High Low Medium Low Low Very Low 
Technical 
Background 
Yes Yes Yes Varies Unlikely Yes Varies 
Legal 
Background 
Unlikely Varies Varies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Represent a 
Side 
Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
Adversarial 
Proceeding 
N/A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
High-Volume 
Docket for 
Individual 
N/A Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Group 
Deliberation 
N/A N/A No N/A No Yes Yes 
Overruled on 
Appeal 
N/A N/A Possible N/A Possible Possible 
Highly 
Unlikely 
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III.  (DE)BIASING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION   
A. THE NEED FOR A NEW CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REGIME 
A reader’s cognitive biases and priors, along with situa-
tional considerations, may not necessarily yield a biased claim 
interpretation, unless the interpretation regime is susceptible to 
allowing them to affect the outcome. The current claim construc-
tion canons allow a considerable degree of interpretive leeway 
and discretion, which makes it difficult to guard against the im-
pact of behavioral influences. At one extreme, if the claim inter-
pretation process were limited to applying a simple bright-line 
rule that disallows the exercise of discretion, then the influence 
of behavioral elements on interpretation may be rendered negli-
gible. However, the Phillips methodology and BRI may be closer 
to the other extreme, as both require parsing claim language 
through a cognitively intensive exercise of judgment in the selec-
tion and application of interpretive standards and sources to 
draw clear boundaries in an abstract, open-ended universe. For 
example, figuring out the “plain and ordinary” meaning of a 
claim term while striking the correct balance between reading it 
in light of, but not reading in limitations from, the specification, 
is a difficult line-drawing problem that yields a wide range of 
plausible answers that may have been molded by behavioral ar-
tifacts. The combination of loose standards,220 behavioral ele-
ments, and different readers may yield considerable reader var-
iance in scope determinations. 
The wide variation in scope that is achievable under the 
Phillips/BRI regime makes error correction difficult. So long as 
a construction appears justifiable or plausible under the Phillips 
methodology or BRI, a reader’s deliberative System 2 process 
may not be able to reliably determine when a cognitive-bias-in-
flected answer provided by the unconscious process of System 1 
requires modification or correction. Moreover, the interpretive 
flexibility provided by the Phillips/BRI regime may allow one 
reader’s idiosyncratic construction, reached through motivated 
reasoning, to be plausibly rationalized to others. For example, if 
an examiner has unconsciously imported limitations from the 
preferred embodiment into his analysis of claim scope, he might 
be able to later explain it away as an instance of reading the 
claim in light of the specification. Likewise, an overly broad in-
terpretation of a claim that is completely unmoored from what 
 
 220. Or “loose canons.” 
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was invented might be justified by the patentee’s litigation coun-
sel as the “plain and ordinary” meaning that does not impermis-
sibly read in limitations from the specification. Similarly, a Fed-
eral Circuit panel’s decision to affirm a district judge’s unduly 
narrow claim construction may have been strongly influenced by 
their affinity for the district judge and the desire to alleviate 
their workload, but may be plausibly rationalized in a short opin-
ion that adopts the district judge’s reasoning emphasizing the 
canon that says claims should be read in light of the specifica-
tion. 
An improved rule of interpretation that might be more re-
sistant to behavioral influences would be one that requires min-
imal parsing, so as to minimize the exercise of discretion and al-
leviate the reader’s cognitive load. As discussed previously, for 
some readers, parsing comes naturally or is essential to their 
purpose for reading a patent.221 However, determining whether 
their parsing is “correct” (however defined) is difficult to ascer-
tain reliably, as illustrated by the panel-dependent nature of the 
Federal Circuit’s claim construction decisions.222 Other readers 
may dispense with parsing either because they are untrained in 
it, do not have time for it, or find it unnecessary because knowing 
the gist of the invention is adequate for their purposes. Of these 
two groups—the parsers and the nonparsers—it is likely that 
the vast majority of the potential readers of a patent fall into the 
latter category, as the former is essentially limited to attorneys 
and judges who are familiar with the Phillips methodology 
and/or BRI and who, unlike the patent examiners, work under 
circumstances where meaningful attempts at parsing cannot be 
avoided. This group of parsers is far outnumbered by the non-
parsing engineers, scientists, business people, investors, and an-
yone else located worldwide who might be interested in review-
ing a U.S. patent to see if some technology of interest is subject 
to exclusive rights. Indeed, with the increasing globalization of 
manufacturing and research and development (R&D), the share 
of nonparsing foreign readers in the audience for U.S. patents 
will only grow. (In fact, over fifty percent of the patents granted 
in the United States over the past several years were of foreign 
 
 221. See supra Parts II.B.2., II.C.2. 
 222. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 2018] BEHAVIORAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 1317 
 
origin.223) In addition, the readers who are responsible for ap-
proving the claims that issue—the patent examiners—likely fall 
into the nonparsing category as a matter of necessity, given their 
workload.224 
With respect to the sources of interpretation, they should be 
normalized or limited in order to mitigate the impact of behav-
ioral elements in their selection and use. As discussed previ-
ously, readers with differing degrees of expertise in a field may 
read in or discern additional limitations beyond the claim lan-
guage (to varying degrees) so as to find patterns, fill in gaps, and 
organize abstract information into something meaningful.225 
Also, differences in information sets, when combined with cogni-
tive biases, may contribute to different readers assigning differ-
ent weights to different sources.226 In such circumstances, 
reader dependence may be mitigated by normalizing the amount 
of technical information that may be read in and dramatically 
increasing the salience of a single interpretive source. One way 
of doing this would be to rely heavily on the specification, which 
is a source of information available to all readers of a patent 
claim. 
B. PROPOSAL: MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION ANALYSIS FOR ALL 
CLAIMS 
At the present time, one circumstance under which the in-
terpretive rule involves limited or minimal parsing, and where 
the interpretive source is normalized to the specification, is in 
the construction of mean-plus-function claim terms under 
35 U.S.C. § 112(f).227 One option, then, for mitigating the influ-
ence of behavioral elements in claim construction would be to 
interpret all claim terms via means-plus-function analysis. 
Currently, means-plus-function analysis is applied only to 
means-plus-function claim terms, which either take the form of 
 
 223. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2015, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat 
.htm (last updated June 15, 2016). 
 224. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 225. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 226. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 227. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f ) (2012) provides that: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means 
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of struc-
ture, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be con-
strued to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described 
in the specification and equivalents thereof. 
 1318 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1273 
 
the word “means” followed by the recitation of a function (e.g., 
“means for fastening”) or simply recite a function and nonce 
words that fail to connote a sufficiently definite structure for per-
forming that function (e.g., “control module”).228 According to 
Federal Circuit case law applying § 112(f), a means-plus-func-
tion claim term is “construed to cover the corresponding struc-
ture, material, or acts described in the specification and equiva-
lents thereof.”229 If the “corresponding structure, material, or 
acts” in support of the claimed function are not described in the 
specification, then the means-plus-function claim term—and 
hence the entire claim—fails to satisfy the definiteness require-
ment.230 The determination of the corresponding structure, ma-
terial, or acts is deemed a matter of claim construction,231 and 
the sufficiency of the disclosure is ascertained from the point of 
view of a PHOSITA.232 Equivalent structures, materials, or acts 
must have been in existence at the time of patent issuance.233  
 
 228. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349–51 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
 229. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f ). Under current Federal Circuit case law, the analysis 
required by § 112(f ), including determinations of equivalence, is applied to in-
dividual means-plus-function claim terms, rather than to the entire claim in 
which that term appears. See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 
1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (analyzing two different means-plus-function limita-
tions in single claim); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (“We decide on an element-by-element basis . . . whether § 112, ¶ 6 ap-
plies.”). John Duffy has observed that § 112(f ) has a textual wrinkle whereby 
means-plus-function analysis might actually apply to the entire claim, rather 
than to just the means-plus-function term, Duffy, supra note 48, at 1209–10, 
whereby the equivalence analysis would serve to limit—not expand—claim 
scope to those devices that meet the claim limitations literally and satisfy the 
triple-identity doctrine of equivalents analysis, see id. at 1204–06. 
 230. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[I]f one em-
ploys means-plus-function language in a claim, one must set forth in the speci-
fication an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that language. [Oth-
erwise,] the applicant has . . . failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim 
the invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112.”). 
 231. Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 
145 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Al-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at 1320 (“[A] structural equivalent under § 112 
must have been available at the time of the issuance of the claim. An equivalent 
structure or act under § 112 cannot embrace technology developed after the is-
suance of the patent because the literal meaning of a claim is fixed upon its 
issuance.” (citation omitted)). The doctrine of equivalents may be used to extend 
coverage of a means-plus-function limitation over after-arising technologies. See 
id. at 1320–21; PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL 
GUIDE 14-86 to 14-87 (3d ed. 2016). 
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In order to apply means-plus-function analysis to all claim 
terms, the non-“means” limitations could be treated as refer-
ences to corresponding items in the specification and their equiv-
alents,234 given that “a means-plus-function limitation is essen-
tially a generic reference for the corresponding structure 
disclosed in the specification.”235 As such, the analysis in the pro-
posed all-means-plus-function claiming regime could resemble 
the current mode of analyzing claims that have every limitation 
cast in means-plus-function form, such as Claim 37 of U.S. Pa-
tent No. 6,947,903.236 
An all-means-plus-function regime may substantially de-
crease, but not completely eliminate, the need for parsing, as 
there will be some incidental parsing involved in mapping the 
claim language to the content of the specification. However, the 
primary focus will no longer be on the claim language, but rather 
on the invention itself and the technical content of the disclosure. 
The amount of parsing involved in means-plus-function analysis 
is likely to impose a lower cognitive load—which may help miti-
gate the influence of behavioral elements arising from workload 
pressures237—than either the Phillips methodology or BRI, both 
 
 234. There might be alternative ways to adapt means-plus-function analysis 
to all claim types. For example, instead of the current limitation-by-limitation 
analysis, an entire claim might be mapped holistically to a particular embodi-
ment and its equivalents. However, a detailed comparison of the various options 
for the universal application of means-plus-function analysis is beyond the 
scope of this Article and is left to future research. This is because the analysis 
in this Article relies on the general characteristics of means-plus-function anal-
ysis—namely, limited parsing of claim language, tying claim scope to the dis-
closed embodiments and equivalents thereof, and evaluating claim definiteness 
based on the content of the disclosure—which would exist in both a limitation-
by-limitation analysis as well as a holistic mapping. 
 235. Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1308. 
 236. Every one of the nine clauses in Claim 37 of U.S. Patent No. 6,947,903 
is cast in means-plus-function form: 
37. A system for monitoring supply chain activity comprising a plural-
ity of supply chain sites, comprising: 
  means for monitoring changed supply-related data . . . ; 
  means for extracting . . . ; 
  means for translating . . . ; 
  means for uploading and collecting . . . ; 
  means for formatting . . . ; 
  means for publishing . . . ; 
  means for monitoring . . . inbound data . . . ; 
  means for detecting a problem condition . . . ; and 
  means for responding to the problem . . . . 
U.S. Patent No. 6,947,903 (filed Apr. 7, 2000). 
 237. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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of which require a reader to articulate the abstract limits of the 
“plain meaning” of a claim term while balancing conflicting can-
ons on the use of the specification as an interpretive source. In 
contrast to formulating the abstract boundaries of a claim term, 
it may be easier to determine whether that claim term has some 
corresponding example in the specification and to ascertain 
whether something is a variation on that example (i.e., an equiv-
alent), as it involves a relatively defined, narrow universe of pos-
sibilities. 
In addition, the specification-correspondence requirement 
in evaluating definiteness and infringement under means-plus-
function analysis may help override the effect of some behavioral 
elements that could have otherwise led a reader to weigh heavily 
some random interpretive source. Dramatically increasing the 
salience of the specification could thus mitigate the effect of dif-
ferences in information sets among different readers.238 Moreo-
ver, having the specification serve as the most salient interpre-
tive source is appropriate because everyone who reads the claims 
has access to it, regardless of their circumstances or background 
knowledge. 
In devising an interpretive scheme that would be resistant 
to behavioral elements, it may be tempting to rely on bright-line 
rules. But a line that is too bright is problematic because it would 
reduce the scope of a claim to the exact embodiment disclosed in 
the specification, which substantially decreases the utility of a 
patent by allowing infringement through trivial variations. 
However, the current claim construction regime (consisting of 
the Phillips methodology and BRI) eschews line-drawing to such 
an extent that it yields results that are highly susceptible to in-
fluence by behavioral elements. While the debate over claim con-
struction methodologies could be viewed as a “rules vs. stand-
ards”239 issue, perhaps what is really needed is a hybrid: a rule 
supplemented with a standard, whereby the rule sets a rela-
tively concrete baseline and the standard provides limited room 
to deviate from that baseline. The rule portion would serve to 
cabin the influence of behavioral elements, while the standards 
portion would allow for flexibility in setting claim scope beyond 
the literal disclosure using the rule as a reference point. We cur-
rently have such a hybrid rule in means-plus-function analysis: 
 
 238. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 239. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudi-
cation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 52–54 n.11 (2007) (cataloging extensive lit-
erature on the “rules versus standards” debate). 
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the “rule” is that the claim term must have corresponding struc-
tures disclosed in the specification, while the “standard” is the 
claim coverage over equivalents. 
Notably, by extending means-plus-function analysis to all 
claim terms, we would be taking a step toward central claim-
ing240 and focusing more closely on what the inventor has actu-
ally invented. Existing commentary suggests that this would be 
a salutary development as central claiming may comport better 
with the unconscious mind than peripheral claiming.241 One of 
the features of central claiming that makes it less cognitively 
burdensome is that it appears to work with (rather than against) 
the representativeness heuristic and our tendency to stereo-
type242 by evaluating claim scope chiefly in terms of the disclosed 
embodiments.243 As discussed previously, the claim scope envi-
sioned by a reader who has engaged in little to no parsing is 
likely to track the embodiments in the specification.244 
While it is not possible to eliminate cognitive biases, the pro-
posed solution happens to work with some of them to limit their 
ability to aggravate reader-to-reader variance in the ultimate 
construction reached. As discussed previously, readers who are 
time-pressed or resource-constrained, such as examiners, may 
be susceptible to dispensing with parsing and might rely instead 
on the heuristic-generated answer that equates claim scope with 
the disclosed embodiments because it is less cognitively inten-
sive to do so.245 Likewise, readers who are incapable of parsing 
are likely to come up with similar heuristic-generated answers 
that largely track the embodiments.246 Conveniently, this heu-
ristic-generated answer—what I call the “cognitive default”—
 
 240. Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 2, at 1774 (“The legacy of cen-
tral claiming also lives on in the practice of means-plus-function claiming.”); 
Fromer, supra note 49, at 738–39; see also Mark D. Janis, Who’s Afraid of Func-
tional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law’s § 112, ¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 291 (1999) (“[A] careful historical 
synthesis demonstrates that the disclosure-plus-equivalents scheme of § 112, 
¶ 6 has links to the doctrine of equivalents as it was understood in the central 
claiming regime.” (footnote omitted)). But see Duffy, supra note 48, at 1204–06 
(suggesting that means-plus-function claiming may have descended from a form 
of peripheral claiming that existed before the formation of the Federal Circuit). 
 241. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 49, at 763–67 (analyzing central claiming 
in light of cognitive science literature). 
 242. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 243. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 49, at 733, 776. 
 244. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 245. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 246. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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corresponds to a first-order approximation of claim scope under 
a means-plus-function analysis. Moreover, this “cognitive de-
fault” is likely shared by the vast majority of the heterogeneous 
population of patent readers, where the nonparsers (e.g., engi-
neers, business people, investors) far outnumber the parsers 
(e.g., patent litigators and federal judges presiding over patent 
cases).247 By imposing means-plus-function analysis for all 
claims, there may be less reader variation in assessing claim 
scope, as it would force nonparsers and parsers alike to moor 
their interpretation of a claim to the structures, materials, and 
acts described in the specification that correspond to each claim 
term—which is what the former is likely to do naturally as a be-
havioral matter, while cabining the extent of the latter’s behav-
iorally-influenced parsing by narrowing the universe of plausible 
constructions. In short, means-plus-function analysis may be 
more resistant to behavioral influences than the Phillips/BRI 
methodology because it accommodates certain behavioral ele-
ments that may systematically yield similar answers for differ-
ent readers, while, at the same time, limiting the realm of plau-
sibility for answers created through motivated reasoning. 
This solution does not seek to eliminate behavioral elements 
(because it is impossible), and instead attempts to normalize and 
manage their effects. In contrast, the Federal Circuit has en-
deavored to eliminate biases in claim construction through its 
many canons. But as the court itself has realized, some “biasing” 
is not only unavoidable but also necessary because claim con-
struction—in order to be meaningful—needs to be performed 
with respect to some concrete frame of reference. A case in point 
is the Federal Circuit’s rule, set forth en banc shortly after its 
creation, that district judges should not construe the claims in 
relation to the accused product.248 This admonition was intended 
to reduce the risk of biasing the claim construction.249 But when 
the Federal Circuit itself was faced with the very situation it had 
envisioned for district court claim construction—that is, it could 
 
 247. See supra Part III.A. 
 248. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(en banc) (“It is only after the claims have been construed without reference to 
the accused device that the claims, as so construed, are applied to the accused 
device to determine infringement.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 249. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he rule forbids a court from . . . reach[ing] a precon-
ceived judgment of infringement or noninfringement. In other words, it forbids 
biasing the claim construction process to exclude or include specific features of 
the accused product or process.”). 
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not consider the accused product in its analysis because no de-
scription of the accused device existed in the appellate record (as 
the appeal was from a stipulated judgment)250—the Federal Cir-
cuit acknowledged that, without the context provided by a de-
scription of the accused device, it “cannot fully and confidently 
review the infringement judgment, including its claim construc-
tion component.”251 The Federal Circuit accordingly softened its 
rule to allow a district court to refer to the accused device for 
context during the claim construction process.252 This develop-
ment has led at least one commentator to posit that claim con-
struction and infringement analysis are two inquiries that are 
effectively merged.253 Indeed, some district judges have adopted 
the practice of combining claim construction proceedings with 
summary judgment hearings.254 In effect, the accused device is 
serving as a reference point for construing claims in federal 
court, which is unavoidable, given that some context is needed to 
focus the claim construction analysis. 
Yet, there is a danger to allowing an accused device to serve 
as the primary or predominant point of reference. This is because 
claim constructions from one case may have preclusive effects in 
concurrent or future cases.255 (In fact, consistent with its “con-
strue once, apply everywhere”256 philosophy of claim construc-
tion, the Federal Circuit has occasionally taken upon itself to 
construe terms that are not necessary to decide the appeal—for 
the benefit of future cases.257) A claim construction that resulted 
from using an accused product as the primary reference point is 
problematic for application in other cases because the construc-
 
 250. Id. at 1330–31. 
 251. Id. at 1330. 
 252. Id. at 1331. 
 253. Jason R. Mudd, To Construe or Not to Construe: At the Interface Between 
Claim Construction and Infringement in Patent Cases, 76 MO. L. REV. 709 
(2011). 
 254. MENELL ET AL., supra note 233, at 2-24. 
 255. Id. at 5-88 to 5-89. 
 256. This is an adaptation of Sun Microsystems’s “Write Once, Run Any-
where” motto for the Java programming language, which was designed for 
cross-platform compatibility. See Write Once, Run Anywhere?, COMPUTER-
WEEKLY.COM (May 2002), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Write-once 
-run-anywhere. 
 257. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that, despite resolution of issues sufficient to support 
affirmance, “we consider it to be in the interest of judicial efficiency, as well as 
in the interest of any future litigation concerning these patents, to review the 
other contested claim limitations”). 
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tion may be idiosyncratic to that accused product in light of an-
choring effects and different information sets.258 In addition, the 
selection of that particular accused product for litigation and the 
progression of that litigation to a final judgment for which pre-
clusive effects may attach to the underlying claim construction 
would be, in a word, fortuitous. Moreover, the construction of a 
term often evolves during litigation as the parties’ understand-
ing of the accused product evolves or when additional accused 
products are added.259 To avoid having the first accused product 
unduly influence how a claim will be construed, an alternative 
reference point is necessary that is not case specific—which 
leaves few options other than the specification. 
C. IMPLICATIONS, CONCERNS, AND OBJECTIONS 
Because behavioral influences pervade the process of claim 
construction across different institutions and among different 
readers,260 its effect on the patent system as a whole may often 
be felt but difficult to quantify. Accordingly, whether the benefits 
of mitigating behavioral influences in claim construction would 
outweigh its costs cannot be determined in the abstract, but in-
stead would need to be assessed in relation to the specific solu-
tion proposed for accomplishing it. For this reason, this Section 
will explore the impact of the all-means-plus-function claiming 
proposal on patentees, patent prosecution, and patent litigation. 
In evaluating the impact of the all-means-plus-function claiming 
proposal, it is worth emphasizing that it is just one possible op-
tion based on an analysis of the relevant behavioral literature 
and claim construction studies existing at the time this Article 
was written. Given the myriad ways in which behavioral ele-
ments may affect claim construction, future research may reveal 
other options for mitigating their effects that may have a differ-
ent cost-benefit profile than the all-means-plus-function claim-
ing proposal. 
1. Policing the Disclosure Requirement 
Apart from mitigating the influence of behavioral elements, 
applying means-plus-function analysis to all claim terms may 
 
 258. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 259. Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“District courts may engage in a rolling claim construction, in which the 
court revisits and alters its interpretation of the claim terms as its understand-
ing of the technology evolves.”). 
 260. See supra Part II. 
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have a beneficial side effect: a greater focus on the disclosure 
during prosecution. Scholars have called for strengthening the 
disclosure requirement,261 which is a topic that has been the sub-
ject of renewed focus by the PTO.262 
Currently, enforcing the disclosure requirement depends 
largely on having examiners closely review applications to en-
sure that each claim is adequately supported by the disclosure. 
But such vigilance may be difficult to maintain, given the agency 
problems associated with examiners and patent attorneys, each 
of whom handles a high volume of applications.263 Compliance 
with the disclosure requirement may be improved if we were to 
create conditions that make it: (1) strategically desirable for ap-
plicants to invest the additional resources to prepare detailed 
disclosures that adequately support the claims; and (2) easier for 
the examiner to police compliance. 
To induce the applicant to prioritize disclosure issues as a 
matter of strategy, we can rely on the fact that patents are, at 
bottom, litigation instruments.264 The application of means-
plus-function analysis to all claim terms would tie the disclosure 
requirement directly to an item that drives litigation strategy: 
claim scope. Currently, the prospect of invalidity based on a dis-
closure defect is not a salient concern of patentees, who have 
more to fear from summary judgment motions for noninfringe-
ment than those for lack of enablement or inadequate written 
description.265 Relatedly, the examiners’ task of policing disclo-
sure issues can be made easier with an all-means-plus-function 
 
 261. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 
591–92 (2009); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Infor-
mation?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 590–92 (2012). 
 262. See, e.g., Topics Announced for Case Studies Pilot, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE: DIRECTOR’S FORUM (May 18, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
blog/director/entry/topics_announced_for_case_studies (announcing case study 
entitled “Enforcement of 35 U.S.C. §112(a) written description in continuing ap-
plications”). 
 263. See Jeremy W. Bock, Patent Quantity, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 287, 318 
(2016). 
 264. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. 
ECON. 391, 395 (2003) (“What the patent grant actually gives the patentholder 
is the right to sue to prevent others from infringing the patent. . . . [A] real pa-
tent does not give the patentee ‘the right to exclude’ but rather the more limited 
‘right to try to exclude’ by asserting its patent in court.”). 
 265. In one study of patent litigation from 2008 to 2009, accused infringers 
won fifty-seven percent of their motions for summary judgment of noninfringe-
ment, Allison et al., supra note 178, at 1788, whereas summary judgment mo-
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claiming rule because the analysis would primarily entail check-
ing for the presence of corresponding embodiments and features 
in the specification, with less emphasis on parsing claim lan-
guage—a task that examiners are unlikely to perform reliably, 
if at all.266 
However, much of the above-listed salutary effects may 
come at the additional cost borne by patentees in connection with 
producing thicker specifications. In an attempt to gain broad 
claim coverage while avoiding the expense of creating a more de-
tailed disclosure, some patentees might prepare specifications 
that are thin on details but endeavor to cover a wide range of 
embodiments through vague descriptions or a laundry list. In 
such instances, examiners may still have difficulty with reliably 
finding disclosure defects because their technical priors may un-
consciously fill in the missing details.267 However, unlike the 
current state of affairs, the active policing of disclosures under 
an all-means-plus-function regime may no longer fall predomi-
nantly on the examiners. 
Instead, district judges—who do not possess the examiners’ 
technical priors—are likely to assume a key role in enforcing the 
disclosure requirement. This is because in an all-means-plus-
function regime, the content of the disclosure would be an issue 
in almost every patent case: most of the infringement allegations 
would turn on whether the accused product is an equivalent of 
the disclosed embodiments,268 and defendants would attempt to 
invalidate the claim for indefiniteness based on some element 
not being adequately described in the specification.269 
In the context of means-plus-function claiming, there is a 
close relationship between the definiteness requirement and the 
other major disclosure doctrines—written description and ena-
 
tions based on lack of enablement and inadequate written description were suc-
cessful only thirteen percent and fifteen percent of the time, respectively. Id. at 
1785 tbl.2. 
 266. See supra Parts II.A.2., II.B.1, II.C.1. 
 267. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 268. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. An equivalents inquiry may 
not be needed in cases of outright copying by the accused infringer, which con-
stitute a distinct minority of patent cases. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark 
A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2009) (“Only 
10.9% of the complaints studied—21 of 193 complaints—contained even an al-
legation that the defendant copied the invention, either from the patent or from 
the plaintiff ’s commercial product.”). 
 269. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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blement—in that all three focus on the adequacy of the disclo-
sure.270 Although the three requirements are distinct, a claim 
that is indefinite under means-plus-function analysis because 
the specification fails to disclose certain technical details might 
also have problems with written description and/or enable-
ment.271 Given that indefiniteness is a question of law,272 and 
that disclosure issues are also central to analyzing infringement 
by § 112(f) equivalents, an all-means-plus-function regime could 
increase the frequency with which issues relating to the ade-
quacy of the disclosure are decided on summary judgment. 
Should the adequacy of the disclosure become a major deci-
sion point in a patent case under an all-means-plus-function re-
gime, it is possible that district judges may develop an uncon-
scious bias toward granting summary judgment of invalidity 
based on indefiniteness as a way to streamline their dockets—
just as they might do currently with noninfringement.273 If such 
a pattern emerges, it may prompt some patentees to shift re-
sources from claim drafting to creating more detailed disclo-
sures. 
2. Nonparsing PHOSITA 
The PHOSITA, as an interpretive entity, may be a better fit 
for an all-means-plus-function claiming regime than the current 
Phillips/BRI regime. 
Because the Phillips/BRI claim construction canons purport 
to capture the manner by which a PHOSITA would have con-
strued the claims, it has effectively required the PHOSITA to 
possess a “mythical”274 combination of abilities: an exhaustive 
 
 270. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (setting forth written description and en-
ablement requirements). 
 271. See In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 149 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (observing that the 
“lack of any corresponding descriptions of structure in the specification upon 
which the scope of equivalents might be based,” could be a basis upon which to 
reject a patent application for failing to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)); see also 
MPEP, supra note 59, § 2181 (“[A]n inadequate disclosure may give rise to both 
an indefiniteness rejection for a means-plus-function limitation and a failure to 
satisfy the written description and enablement requirements of section 112(a) 
or pre-AIA section 112, first paragraph.”). 
 272. See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 273. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1604 (2011) (“[T]he courts have constructed 
this person with attributes acknowledged to be highly fictional, and those fic-
tional attributes make it difficult or impossible to gain any real intuition as to 
the cognitive processes of the mythical PHOSITA.”). 
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familiarity with both the prior art and the principles of claim 
construction under the current interpretive regime. Because 
very few, if any, individuals would embody the attributes of this 
“lawyerly” PHOSITA, claim construction from its perspective 
may not be robust in practice. Indeed, a study by Jonas Anderson 
and Peter Menell of over a decade of Federal Circuit claim con-
struction opinions suggests that claim construction rarely, if 
ever, turns on an analysis of who the PHOSITA is in a given 
case.275 If, in practice, an analysis of the PHOSITA’s identity is 
not an essential feature of construing claims under the Phil-
lips/BRI regime, then perhaps claims are being construed pres-
ently in a manner that is effectively unmoored to a common in-
terpretive entity, thereby providing an opportunity for 
behavioral elements to supply an interpretive entity that is con-
venient for whomever is reading the claim. 
Unsurprisingly, some commentators have suggested alter-
natives to the PHOSITA construct: Greg Reilly has proposed an 
“ordinary reader” standard,276 while John Golden has argued in 
favor of “the perspective of a patent attorney with access to the 
technological knowledge of an ordinary artisan.”277 But maybe 
the problem lies not with the interpretive entity but instead with 
the interpretive rules. Perhaps the PHOSITA may be better 
suited to the proposed all-means-plus-function claiming regime, 
where her technical expertise would matter more. 
Because means-plus-function claiming entails minimal 
parsing of claim language, we would no longer require claims to 
be construed from the point of view of a “lawyerly” PHOSITA 
with an unnatural talent for exegesis, but rather a “classical” 
PHOSITA whose “mythical” abilities would be limited to tech-
nical knowledge. Because the Phillips/BRI regime is designed for 
parsers, the PHOSITA does not have a meaningful role in that 
system. By contrast, in an all-means-plus-function claiming re-
gime, the determination of claim scope would focus less on con-
struing individual words and phrases in a claim and more on the 
 
 275. Anderson & Menell, supra note 39, at 55–56 (“In only 12 of the 787 
(1.5%) written claim construction opinions issued from 2000 through 2011 does 
the Federal Circuit even identify the PHOSITA.”). 
 276. Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Or-
dinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 248, 288 
(2014) [hereinafter Reilly, Ordinary Reader]. 
 277. Golden, supra note 37, at 328 (arguing for “replacing the ordinary arti-
san rule with a rule declaring the governing perspective of claim construction 
to be a hybrid one: the perspective of a patent attorney with access to the tech-
nological knowledge of an ordinary artisan”). 
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substance of the disclosure, thereby drawing on the technical 
perspective of a PHOSITA to evaluate claim definiteness (by as-
sessing the sufficiency of the disclosure of the corresponding 
structure, materials, or acts)278 as well as to determine equiva-
lents.279 
3. Procedural Impact 
By adopting an all-means-plus-function claiming rule, the 
most visible procedural impact on a patent case may involve 
changes to the Markman280 process used by district courts to for-
mally construe claims.281 Currently, the Markman process in-
volves parties preparing extensive briefing on the construction 
of individual claim terms, which is followed by a hearing and the 
issuance of a formal opinion by the trial court construing the 
claim terms separate from any infringement or validity issues.282 
In an all-means-plus-function claiming regime, the focus on the 
content of the disclosure and technical equivalents would lessen 
the need to closely parse claim language, resulting in a conver-
gence between the claim language and the embodiments of the 
invention. This may turn claim construction into a more fact-in-
tensive inquiry that melds with the specific liability issues in a 
given case, with the core issue being whether the accused prod-
uct (or the prior art in an invalidity analysis) corresponds to the 
embodiment shown in the disclosure or an equivalent. As such, 
this proposal would likely take the claim construction process 
back to how patents were litigated at a time before Markman, 
when the boundaries of a claim were determined as part of a fac-
tual inquiry regarding infringement or validity, rather than as a 
standalone legal issue.283 
 
 278. See Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378–79 
(1999) (“[I]f one employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one must set 
forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by the 
claim language.” (quoting In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 
1994))).  
 279. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“[I]n the § 112, ¶ 6 context . . . an accused device is equivalent when it performs 
the identical function in substantially the same way to achieve substantively 
the same result.”). 
 280. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996) (ob-
serving that judges, with their training in exegesis, are better suited to inter-
preting patent claims than a jury). 
 281. See MENELL ET AL., supra note 233, at 2-13. 
 282. A detailed description of the Markman process is provided in id. at 
chapter 5. 
 283. See Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 2, at 1770–71. 
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Currently, trial courts rely heavily on the Markman process 
to help streamline cases via summary judgment because how a 
claim is construed decides the issue of infringement where the 
operation of the accused device is not in dispute.284 Under an all-
means-plus-function claiming regime, however, the formal “con-
struction” of individual claim terms during the Markman pro-
cess might be reduced to an indefiniteness inquiry directed to 
whether the claim elements have corresponding structures in 
the disclosure.285 Any ensuing infringement analysis would 
likely entail a fact-intensive evaluation of equivalents.286 It is 
possible, then, that a greater proportion of patent cases might be 
tried to a jury. (Or, as discussed later in this Section, it might 
not.) 
The jury trials that would be held under the proposed claim-
ing regime might be an improvement over current trials. The 
typical jury is a group of laypeople—namely, nonparsers—who 
may find it easier to understand the issues in a trial conducted 
under the all-means-plus-function claiming proposal because the 
presentation on liability issues would be focused primarily on 
comparing the embodiments in the patent (rather than the claim 
language) with the accused product or the prior art, which the 
nonparsing lay jurors are likely to do naturally.287 By contrast, 
in a trial conducted under the Phillips methodology, the jury is 
instructed on the formal construction of multiple claim terms,288 
with which the parties frame their presentations on infringe-
ment and validity. In other words, under the current regime, the 
jury must analyze the case through a layer of construed lan-
guage. Under the all-means-plus-function proposal, this extra 
layer would be absent. 
 
 284. See MENELL ET AL., supra note 233, at 2-23 to 2-24. 
 285. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 
F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] determination of corresponding structure 
is a determination of the meaning of the ‘means’ term in the claim and is thus 
also a matter of claim construction.”). 
 286. See Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (“The determination whether an accused device is a section 112 
equivalent of the described embodiment is a question of fact.”). 
 287. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 288. See AFG Indus. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“It is critical for trial courts to set forth an express construction of the material 
claim terms in dispute, in part because the claim construction becomes the basis 
of the jury instructions, should the case go to trial.”); MENELL ET AL., supra note 
233, at 5-28 to 5-29 (discussing the Markman process in the context of the re-
spective roles of the court and the jury). 
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Whether the proportion of patent cases with jury trials will 
materially increase under an all-means-plus-function claiming 
regime is difficult to predict because courts may adopt coping 
mechanisms to streamline their workload, especially given the 
labor-intensive nature of jury trials. As discussed previously, 
docket pressures may exert a powerful behavioral impact on ad-
judication outcomes.289 An appreciable increase in the number 
of jury trials in patent cases, which tend to be complex, could 
substantially burden the trial courts, which could react in a cou-
ple of ways. For example, courts might modify existing proce-
dures (e.g., local rules)290 or adopt new ones that have the effect 
of delaying the trial date, thereby providing parties more time to 
settle before trial. An example of this would be changing the rate 
of granting stays pending parallel proceedings in the PTO.291 
District judges determined to streamline their dockets might 
also begin granting summary judgment on validity issues more 
often in order to compensate for any decrease in opportunities 
for granting summary judgment of noninfringement in an all-
means-plus-function claiming regime that blends claim con-
struction and infringement into a fact-intensive equivalents in-
quiry.292 The validity issues that would most likely see an in-
crease in summary dispositions would be those that are 
questions of law (e.g., indefiniteness, enablement, obviousness). 
However, much of the impetus for the procedural adapta-
tions described in the immediately preceding paragraph may be 
lost if the absolute number of patent cases were to fall, so as to 
yield an absolute decrease in the number of jury trials, despite 
an increase in the proportion of patent cases that make it to a 
 
 289. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 290. The patent local rules were originally created to streamline the han-
dling of patent cases. See generally James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, 
Content, Application and Influence of the Northern District of California’s Pa-
tent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 965 (2009). 
 291. Over the past several years, the rate of granting stays for inter partes 
review has varied among district courts, ranging from thirty-seven percent to 
eighty-six percent. DICKEY, supra note 199. 
 292. To be clear, district courts have granted, and the Federal Circuit has 
affirmed, the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement based on lack of 
equivalence. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1345–46 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment of noninfringement of means-
plus-function claim for lack of equivalence); Baran v. Med. Device Techs., Inc., 
616 F.3d 1309, 1316–18 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, 
Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same). The fact-intensive nature of 
the equivalence inquiry makes the grant of summary judgment more difficult 
compared to an analysis that depends solely on the claim construction under 
the current Phillips/BRI regime. 
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jury. If claim scope were generally narrower under an all-means-
plus-function claiming regime,293 then fewer suits might be filed, 
particularly in the high technology industry, as discussed in the 
next Subsection. 
4. Claim Scope and Error Costs 
Because claim scope under means-plus-function analysis is 
limited to the structures, materials, and acts disclosed in the 
specification and their equivalents,294 patentees might feel com-
pelled to file heftier specifications describing numerous embodi-
ments in order to obtain adequate claim coverage. These con-
cerns are seemingly reflected in application filing trends that 
suggest patentees generally disfavor295 means-plus-function 
claim terms, which, in recent years, are present in less than ten 
percent of published patent applications.296 
When concerns about narrow claims and thick specifications 
are weighed against the potential enhancement to social welfare 
that might result from an all-means-plus-function claiming re-
gime, the net effect is expected to be positive. As an initial mat-
ter, this claiming rule may not always result in a narrower scope 
overall when compared to a “plain meaning” construction, given 
that the boundaries of a means-plus-function claim include an 
equivalence aspect.297 To the extent that means-plus-function 
claims may be narrower, they may be less susceptible to invali-
dation based on prior art. 
More importantly, the current Phillips/BRI regime does not 
have an efficient mechanism for policing claim overbreadth. Spe-
cifically, “plain meaning” constructions are susceptible to the 
“Morse problem,”298 whereby the scope of a claim may be 
stretched beyond the specific solution (and equivalents) invented 
by the patentee so as to cover embodiments that the patentee 
 
 293. See infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
 294. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f ) (2012). 
 295. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Mattingly, Avoiding Invocation of Functional 
Claim Language in Computer-Implemented Inventions, IPWATCHDOG (June 18, 
2015), http://ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/18/avoiding-invocation-of-functional 
-claim-language-in-computer-implemented-inventions/id=58803 (“[D]rafting 
claims that avoid the invocation of [35 U.S.C.] § 112(f ) is the first line of defense 
for . . . unnecessarily narrowing the scope of the invention.”). 
 296. Dennis Crouch, Means Plus Function Claiming, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 14, 
2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/means-plus-function-claiming.html. 
 297. Cotropia, Deference, supra note 162, at 1102 n.27. 
 298. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
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either chose not to disclose or failed to contemplate.299 A related 
phenomenon is functional claiming, in which patentees use func-
tional claim language (that has been crafted to avoid triggering 
means-plus-function analysis) in order to claim all implementa-
tions that achieve a particular result.300 Overly broad claims 
that allow patentees to capture a wide range of embodiments 
they did not actually disclose may stifle the introduction of alter-
native or improved products to the market301 and deprive the 
public of the detailed descriptions of those embodiments over 
which the patentee has been granted exclusive rights. Over-
claiming and unfair surprise to the public could become less 
prevalent with a central-claiming-type rule (such as the all-
means-plus-function claiming proposal) where the focus is on the 
substance of the invention, rather than the language of the 
claims,302 and claim scope would closely follow the disclosure—
an item of public record that is fixed in time303 and to which 
every reader of a patent claim has access.304 
The impact of an all-means-plus-function claiming regime 
may vary according to the type of technology, especially where 
prosecution practices may differ as a result of technology-de-
pendent precedents.305 For example, Federal Circuit case law 
imposes a more rigorous disclosure requirement for biotechnol-
ogy inventions compared to software inventions.306 Because bio-
technology claims are prone to being limited to what is disclosed 
 
 299. Instead of limiting his claim to what he actually invented (i.e., the tel-
egraph), id. at 108, Samuel Morse sought to claim “the essence” of his invention, 
which is “the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which 
I call electro-magnetism, however developed,” id. at 112. The court found this 
claim to be “too broad, and not warranted by law.” Id. at 113; see also Lemley, 
Functional Claiming, supra note 139, at 930 (“[P]atentees can often benefit from 
ambiguous patent claims by twisting the language of the patent claim to cover 
something the inventor never in fact had in mind at the time.”). 
 300. See Lemley, Functional Claiming, supra note 139, at 907–08. 
 301. See id. at 912. 
 302. Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 2, at 1762. 
 303. There may be changes made to an issued patent through reissues or 
reexaminations. 
 304. Patents are widely available and searchable through the PTO website, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/search-patents#heading-1, 
as well as other online resources such as Google Patents, https://patents.google 
.com. 
 305. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology 
Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, 
Technology Specific]. 
 306. Id. at 1156. 
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in the specification,307 it is likely that the patent portfolios of bi-
otechnology companies already contain numerous patents with 
thick disclosures and narrow claims.308 As such, for the biotech-
nology industry—where patents often directly impact a com-
pany’s commercialization plans309—the all-means-plus-function 
claiming proposal is likely to have a neutral or muted business 
impact, as it is unlikely to result in a dramatic change to its pros-
ecution or litigation practices. 
In contrast to patents covering biotechnology inventions, 
those relating to high-technology inventions (such as electronics 
and software) are currently subject to a relatively weak disclo-
sure requirement,310 and often contain functional claim terms 
that effectively allow the patentee to claim all the solutions to a 
given problem or all the ways of implementing a concept, rather 
than a specific solution or a specific implementation that the pa-
tentee actually developed.311 As a result, the all-means-plus-
function claiming proposal is likely to have a dramatic impact on 
the patent portfolios in the high-technology industry: patentees 
may be prompted to file thicker specifications with more embod-
iments, and the aggregate claim scope of most patents may be 
substantially narrower as they will cover only the content of the 
disclosure and any equivalents. As a consequence, this could de-
press the number of patent suits involving the high-technology 
industry. Despite a dramatic impact on prosecution and litiga-
tion practices, it is possible that the net business impact of the 
all-means-plus-function claiming proposal may be muted in the 
high-technology industry, given that the link between patenting 
and innovation appears to be inconclusive for industries other 
 
 307. Id. at 1181–82. 
 308. See id. at 1182. 
 309. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Pa-
tentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 545–47 (2009) (describing how development ef-
forts for a drug might be halted if patent protection were to be denied for that 
drug). 
 310. See Burk & Lemley, Technology Specific, supra note 305, at 1185. 
 311. See Lemley, Functional Claiming, supra note 139, at 907–08. 
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than biotechnology,312 and high-technology companies appear to 
routinely ignore patents when deciding to introduce products.313 
Given the difficulty of using words to capture an invention 
with precision,314 means-plus-function claiming might be ulti-
mately less costly, as it allows the invention to be claimed with-
out the abstract wordsmithing required under the current pe-
ripheral claiming regime.315 As Doug Lichtman has observed, 
“the costs of drafting bulletproof claim language can be substan-
tial,”316 and the marginal benefit for improving claim language 
is rather small given that most patents are not read,317 let alone 
litigated.318 Furthermore, given the inherent limitations of lan-
guage,319 the level of linguistic precision necessary for a well-
functioning peripheral claiming regime may not, in fact, be 
achievable in many cases,320 especially for the most innovative 
inventions for which the relevant terminology has not yet ma-
tured.321 
 
 312. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 
OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 474 (2005) (summarizing literature); Edwin Mansfield, Pa-
tents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 180 (1986) (“De-
spite the fact that the patent system generally is defended at least partly on the 
grounds that it increases the rate of innovation, the present study indicates that 
its effects in this regard are very small in most of the industries we studied.”). 
 313. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 20–
21 (“[C]ompanies do not seem much deterred from making products by the 
threat of . . . patent litigation. Intel continues to make microprocessors, Cisco 
routers, and Microsoft operating system software, even though they collectively 
face nearly 100 patent-infringement lawsuits at a time and receive hundreds 
more threats of suit each year.”). 
 314. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. 
Cl. 1967) (“The very nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous 
claim a rare occurrence.”). 
 315. See Fromer, supra note 49, at 777. 
 316. Lichtman, supra note 123, at 2015. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 169, at 1501 (estimating 
that “at most only about two percent of all patents are ever litigated”). 
 319. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 731 (2002) (“The language in the patent claims may not capture every nu-
ance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its nov-
elty.”). 
 320. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Patent Notice and the Trouble with 
Plain Meaning, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1093, 1116 (2016) (“[T]he idea that patent claim 
notice could be rendered precise enough to justify an analogy with physical 
fences is illusory.”). 
 321. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
(“Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The diction-
ary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made 
for the sake of words, but words for things.”); Reilly, Ordinary Reader, supra 
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Some may wonder if the notice function of patents might be 
undermined by means-plus-function claiming because an equiv-
alents analysis may be required to determine literal infringe-
ment. Although this claiming regime may not yield the most pre-
cise claims, they may perform an adequate job in most 
instances.322 To the extent that there might be uncertainty in 
claim scope, Jeanne Fromer observes that “[u]ncertainty in pe-
ripheral claims lies in the precise reach of each of the claim 
words, whereas uncertainty in central claims [of which the pro-
posed all-means-plus-function claims would be a derivative] lies 
in how many embodiments will be found to be substantially sim-
ilar to the more limited claimed set.”323 That is, unlike the cur-
rent regime, any uncertainty in claim scope associated with the 
all-means-plus-function claiming proposal would not be an arti-
fact of wordsmithing, but would instead require resolution 
through an evaluation of the substance of the invention. Under 
the proposal, it is expected that most readers will arrive at sim-
ilar first-order approximations of claim scope,324 which may be 
adequate for most purposes, while the labor-intensive and costly 
determination of the precise boundaries of the claim based on an 
analysis of equivalents can be delayed until litigation actually 
occurs. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article presents a detailed exploration of the behav-
ioral influences that may affect how patent claims are construed. 
The current claim construction rules yield assessments of scope 
that are highly susceptible to being influenced by a reader’s cog-
nitive biases, priors, and situational considerations. This is be-
cause the current process for construing claims requires the le-
galistic parsing of claim language, which entails exercising 
judgment and discretion in the choice of conflicting canons and 
the selection of sources from an open universe to yield a wide 
range of potential constructions that may be plausibly rational-
ized. A rule of construction that would be more resistant to the 
influence of behavioral elements would be one that minimizes 
 
note 276, at 265 (listing examples illustrating how the limitations of language 
may affect how inventions are claimed). 
 322. See Fromer, supra note 49, at 765 (“Even if central claims do not provide 
perfect content notice of categorical boundaries, the evidence indicates that it 
might do a good job at communicating the crux of the protected embodiments.”). 
 323. Id. at 776. 
 324. See supra Part III.B. 
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parsing and ties claim scope to the embodiments in the disclo-
sure and its equivalents. Such a rule may be implemented by 
extending means-plus-function analysis to all claim terms. Be-
cause behavioral influences pervade multiple aspects of the pro-
cess of construing claims, future research may reveal other ways 
to mitigate their impact. 
